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RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO
VISIONS FOR A STANDARD OF REVIEW IN
ERISA DENIAL OF BENEFIT CLAIMS
Alison S. Rozbruch*

INTRODUCTION

A majority of Americans receive health care benefits as part of
their employment.1 These benefits are encompassed in private
sector "employee welfare benefit plans," which include pension,
health care, accident, disability, death benefit and other employee
benefit plans, and are governed by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA"). 2 "Congress enacted ERISA in
1974 after a decade of work on pension and employee benefit
issues."3 ERISA's stated purpose is to uniformly protect "the
interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries... by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by
providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to
federal courts." 4 Although the Act purports to protect participants,

* J.D. Brooklyn Law School, 2001; B.A. Union College 1998. The author

would like to dedicate this Note to her parents for their constant love and
support. She would also like to thank her brother and friends for their
encouragement and suggestions throughout this process.
See RAND E. ROSENBLATr ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH
CARE SYSTEM 159-72 (1997).
2 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (2000).
' Jeffrey A. Brauch, The FederalCommon Law of ERISA, 21 HARv. J.L. &

PUB.POL'Y 541, 546 (1998) (noting that Congress was unhappy with the existing
regulation of pension plans because many workers were not receiving the
pensions they were promised).
4 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000).
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judicial decisions continually interpret ERISA as a shield for
employers, insurance companies and plan administrators.'
It is clear from the legislative history both what is explicitly
stated and from what is absent from the text of the statute that
Congress intended the courts to develop a federal common law
dealing with participant rights and plan obligations under ERISA.6
Pursuant to Section 1132 (a)(1)(B) of the statute, a participant may
bring a claim to recover benefits due under the plan.' ERISA,
however, is silent on the standard of review under which these
claims will be reviewed.8 The language contained within a plan is
the determining factor for the standard of review the court will
employ when reviewing denial of benefit claims under ERISA. 9 If
the court concludes that the plan language does not vest discretion
in the plan administrator, then the administrator's decision is
closely scrutinized under a de novo standard of review.'l Con5 See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Ass'n, 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) (holding that

no damages were recoverable under the act and that advisors and consultants
who may wrongfully participate in plan activities and/or a fiduciary's breach were
immune from suit); Pilot Life v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (holding that
there are no ERISA remedies available for mental distress, punitive damages or
state common law bad faith claims against the insurance company); Mass. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (rejecting claims for compensatory
or punitive damages and holding that the remedies provided in section
1132(a)(1)(B) were solely for the benefit of the plan as opposed to the rights of
the participants and their beneficiaries).
6 120 CONG. REC. S29942 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974). Senator Javits said that
"a body of federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with
issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans."
Id.
' 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) ("A civil action may be brought by a participant
or beneficiary to recover benefits due to him under the terms of the plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan.").
8 Id. ERISA provides for review of denial of benefit claims by the federal
courts, but is silent on the standard of review to be used by the courts in
reviewing the claims. Id.
9 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (stating
that the standard of review of a denial of benefit claim "is likely to turn upon the
interpretation of the terms in the plan at issue").
" See Robert Mason Hogg, The Evidentiary Scope of De Novo Review in
ERISA Benefits Litigation After Firestone Tire and Rubber v. Bruch, 78 MINN.
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versely, if the court concludes that the language in the plan vests
discretion with the plan administrator, then the decision is reviewed
under a deferential arbitrary and capricious standard. 1 This
deferential standard is a powerful mechanism used by the federal
courts to undermine the rights of participants and "thwart benefit
expectations.""
This Note examines the specific language in benefit plans and
the various standards used by federal courts in determining the
appropriate standard of review for denial of benefit claims under
ERISA, and the link between the two. Part I of this Note examines
the framework of ERISA, including its history, structure and the
legislative intent behind its enactment, as well as the inherent
tensions that have arisen in light of the absence of statutory
language conferring a definite standard for judicial review. Part II
focuses on the circuit splits over the types of language and methods
of interpretation that result in a deferential abuse of discretion
review. This split reflects diverging policy choices by the courts,
and has prevented the development of a uniform body of federal
common law to govern the administration of ERISA plans when
determining the appropriate standard of review. 3 Part II also

L. REV. 1575, 1583 (1994) (noting that the circuits are also split over both the
standard of review for denial of benefit claims, as well as the evidentiary scope
of review for ERISA benefits litigation).
" George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Reformulating the Federal Common Law
for PlanInterpretation,32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 955, 960 (1995) (stating that the
arbitrary and capricious standard requires only the use of one of many logical
reasons and some minimal documentation to confirm the administrator's decision
for the denial of benefits pursuant to an ERISA claim).
12Jay Conison, Suits for Benefits Under ERISA, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 33
(1992) (arguing that using a deferential standard of review "pays little attention
to ERISA's central purpose of safeguarding benefit expectations and rights" and

"often seems perversely designed to thwart benefit expectations").
13 ROSENBLATT, supra note 1, at 196.
[ERISA] enforcement cases reflect a struggle over two visions of
ERISA. One vision seeing ERISA's primary goal as the protection of
employees' interests ... A second vision sees ERISA's primary purpose
as encouraging employers voluntarily to offer benefit plans by limiting
employers' costs and liability, and maximizing their discretion.
ROSENBLATT, supra note 1, at 196.
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explains how the conflicting approaches used by the courts in
determining the appropriate standard of review has effectively
undermined the twin aims of ERISA: uniformity in enforcement
and the safeguarding of patients' rights. 14 Part III proposes and
recommends a statutory modification that imposes a uniform
standard for plan language necessary to vest discretion in the plan
administrator. This Note concludes that in order for ERISA to
comport with its underlying protective policies, the statute must be
amended to require that health plans contain explicit discretiongranting language - such as 'discretion' or 'deference to' - in

order to effectively confer discretion upon the plan administrator
and restrict judicial review to an abuse of discretion standard.

I.

EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT AND SECURITY ACT

The Employee Retirement and Security Act" was enacted by
Congress in 1974 in an effort to facilitate the growth and development of private "employee welfare benefit plan[s]"' 6 and to
address the problems facing the existing regulation of pension
plans.1 7 "Congress was unhappy with the existing regulation of
pension plans, believing that many workers who had been promised
pensions were not receiving them."' 18 It also found that plans and

1429 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000) (specifying the explicit policy objectives of
ERISA).

"s29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
16Id. § 1002(1). Employee welfare benefit plans include health, accident,
disability, death, unemployment, vacation, job training benefits, day care, legal
services or scholarship funds. Id.
17 ROSENBLATr, supra note 1, at 159 (noting that "[ERISA] was enacted
after a decade of Congressional concern about two kinds of 'market failure' that
often compromised pension security"). The two kinds of consequences are first,
that deregulation of the market that provided employee pension plans left many
plans underfunded because of managements' failure to set aside adequate assets.
Id. Second, while pre-ERISA state and federal law in theory required pension
plans to be administered in trust for the benefit of employees, regulatory and
remedial provisions were inadequate. Id. at 160.
i"Brauch, supra note 3, at 547 n. 19 (citing 120 CONG. REc. S29950 (daily
ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (statement of Sen. Bensten) ("[G]overnment statistics indicate

DENIAL OF BENEFIT CLAIMS

their sponsors faced complex and conflicting state laws and
regulations. 9 Congress concluded that the inconsistencies in the
laws and regulations resulted in administrative inefficiencies and
costs that ultimately hurt plan participants. 2' The legislature
sought to rectify these issues through the creation of nationally
uniform benefit laws2 ' designed to protect employees and their
beneficiaries in employee benefit plans. 2 As a result, Congress
enacted ERISA, establishing standards of conduct, responsibility,
and obligation for administrators of employee benefit plans, and
providing appropriate remedies, sanctions and ready access to the
federal courts.23

that during 1972 alone more than 15,000 pension plan participants lost retirement
benefits because their pension plan terminated with insufficient assets to meet all
plan obligations.")).
19 Dahlia Schwartz, Note, BreathingLessons for the ERISA Vacuum: Toward
a Reconciliationof ERISA's Competing Objectives in the Health Benefits Arena,
79 B.U.L. REv. 631, 635-36 (1999) (stating that "Congress enacted ERISA in
response to three related problems that attained national prominence in the early
1970's. First, in the absence of state and federal regulation for employee benefit
plans, many employers underfunded plans. Second, plan administrators were not
obliged to act as fiduciaries. Third, corporations that engaged in interstate
commerce were faced with up to fifty sets of laws designed to address the
previous two concerns.").
20 See H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 12 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4639, 4650.
21 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) (stating that ERISA broadly preempts
"any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan").
22 Id. § 1001(a) (stating that "the lack of employee information and adequate
safeguards concerning [plan] operation, it is desirable in the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries ...[that] safeguards be provided with respect
to the establishment, operation and administration of such plans"); see also Shaw
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90, 100 (1983) (stating that ERISA is a
comprehensive statute designed to further the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries in employee benefit plans).
23 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (highlighting that the express legislative purpose
of ERISA was to protect plan participants rights through the creation of uniform
federal regulations and standards).
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A.

ERISA's Regulatory Framework

Although employee benefits traditionally were a matter of state
contract law, ERISA brought employee benefit plans under federal
regulatory authority in an effort to achieve its purposes of protecting patients' rights and establishing uniform standards and regulations for the field.2 4 In order to achieve these fundamental
policies, Congress engaged in a three step process.2 ' First, Congress eliminated the state law obstacles with a sweeping ERISA
preemption provision, bypassing all state law relating to employee
benefit plans.26 Second, with respect to pension plans, ERISA
established standards for financial vesting 27 and participant
vesting. 28 For both pension plans and employee welfare benefit
plans (including health benefits), ERISA requires that plan
administrators meet fiduciary standards,2 9 disclose information
24

See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98-99; 120 CONG. REC. S29933 (daily ed. Aug. 22,

1974) (statement of Sen. Williams); 120 CONG. REc. H29197 (daily ed. Aug. 20,
1974) (statement of Rep. Dent).
25 Flint, supra note 11, at 960 (tracing the evolution of ERISA and its
federal common law plan of interpretation calling for the reformulation of a
standard for federal common law plan of interpretation consistent with the
protection of participants' reasonable expectations).
26 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (stating the provisions of this chapter "shall
supercede any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan"). Other provisions exempt certain laws from the
application of this general preemption provision. Section 1144(b)(2)(A), exempts
some state laws regulating insurance, banking, or securities. Id. § 114(b)(2))A).
Section 1 144(b)(4), exempts generally applicable criminal laws, and Section 1144
(b)(7), exempts qualified domestic-relations orders. Id. § 114(b)(4)(7).
27 See 29 U.S.C. § 1081-1086 (setting minimum funding standards ensuring
that plans have sufficient assets to pay promised benefits).
28 See id. § 1053 (setting minimum vesting standards ensuring that promised
benefits become non-forfeitable within a reasonably short period).
29 See id. § 1002(21)(A)(iii) (indicating that a plan administrator is a
fiduciary if she "has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility
in [plan] administration"). A plan fiduciary must act "solely in the interest of the
participants and their beneficiaries" and perform her duties "with the care, skill,
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent
man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims." Id. §
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fully,30 and provide fair benefit claim procedures. 3' Lastly, Congress made federal causes of action and remedies available to
participants in federal court.32 Section 1132 (a)(1)(B) of ERISA
supplies participants and beneficiaries with a direct means for their
benefit expectations to be fulfilled.33 This provision allows a suit
to be brought to recover "benefits due under the terms of the
plan"34 and is regarded by some commentators to be ERISA's
"bottom line." 35 ERISA does not regulate the substantive content
of plans that provide health care coverage.36 The amount and
types of benefits are left to be negotiated between employers and
insurers.37
The framework of the statute is composed of standards
designed to ensure that benefit expectations are honored and that
entities administering benefits are subject to uniform standards.38
Despite its comprehensive nature, ERISA has many gaps and is
silent on many issues. 39 The accepted understanding is that
1104(a)(1)(A)-(B).
30

See id. §§ 1022,

1023,

1025 (establishing standards of conduct,

responsibility and obligations for fiduciaries under employment benefit plans
including standards for information disclosure and reporting, while also requiring
that plan administrators must report detailed financial information to federal
regulators and disclose information to individual plan participants and beneficiaries).
31 See id. § 1133(1).
32 See id. § 1132(a),(e). A participant or beneficiary may sue "to recover
benefits due to him under the terms of the plan, to enforce his rights under the
terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the
plan." Id. § (a)(1)(B).
13 Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
34id.

See Conison, supra note 12, at 3.
See McGann v. H&H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 1991)
(citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983) (noting that ERISA
does not require employers to offer any particular benefits)).
37 Id.
3' 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (stating that ERISA supersedes "any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan").
'9 Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (providing for review of denial of benefit claims by
the federal courts without enunciating the standard of review to be used by the
courts in reviewing the claims). Also, legislative history suggests that Congress
intended courts to develop "appropriate equitable relief' for ERISA's remedial
31
36
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Congress intended the federal courts to create common-law rights
and obligations consistent with ERISA's purposes.4 ° Unfortunately,
judicial interpretation has made employee benefits less secure by
creating a body of common law that controverts ERISA's initial
policy objectives."
B. Legislative Purpose - The Twin Aims of ERISA
Although information regarding the legislative history and
intent of ERISA is sparse, statements discussing the "twin aims of
ERISA" - uniformity and participant protection - can be ascertained from the legislative history and policy declarations surrounding the enactment of the statute. The record reflects that Congress
intended ERISA to "preempt the field for federal regulations, in
order to eliminate the threat of conflicting or inconsistent state and
local regulation of employee benefit plans. 42 ERISA broadly
preempts any and all state laws that "relate to ' 4 3 employee
welfare benefits, and grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction for
nearly all disputes involving employee benefit plans.44 This
sweeping preemption provision indicates Congress' intent to
provide employers and beneficiaries with a uniform and predictable

provisions contained in Section 1132 (a)(3). Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,
473 U.S. 134 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)). In
addition, ERISA provides a broad grant of preemption with respect to state laws
and remedies, the specifics of which have been left to federal common law. 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a).
40 120 CONG. REC. S29942 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (statement of Senator
Javits). Sen. Javits's full statement was: "It is also intended that a body of federal
substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving
rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans." Id.
41 See, e.g., O'Bryhim v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 98-1472, 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 19232, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 16, 1999); Perez v. Aetna Life
Ins., 150 F.3d 550, 557 (6th Cir. 1998); Donato v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 19 F.3d
375, 379 (7th Cir. 1994).
42 Pilot Life v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987) (quoting 120 CONG. REC.
S29933 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (statement of Senator Williams)).
4' 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
44id.
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regulatory scheme within which benefit plans may be structured
and enforced.45
The legislative history suggests that one of the goals of
preemption was uniformity4 6 The purpose of having a uniform
body of federal law is to provide employers with a predictable
regulatory scheme in which they can structure and promote benefit
plans. 7 Congress sought to preempt state law in order to facilitate
the growth of employee welfare benefit plans and "minimize the
administrative and financial burden of complying with conflicting
directives among states or between states and the federal government ... [and to prevent] the potential conflict of substantive law
... requiring the tailoring of plans and employer conduct to the
law of each jurisdiction.
The result is that ERISA has been
interpreted as preempting virtually all of the vast body of state
insurance, contract, tort, and other law applicable to health
plans.49
Congress further declared the policy of ERISA is:
[T]o protect ... the interests of participants in employee
benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the
See 120 CONG. REC. H29197 (daily ed. Aug 20, 1974) (statement of Rep.
Dent) (noting that many considered "the crowning achievement of [ERISA as]
the reservation to federal authority [of] the sole power to regulate the field of
employee benefit plans... eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent
state and local regulation").
41

46 Id.

Schwartz, supra note 19, at 650.
See Ingersoll-Rand v. Mclendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990). Mclendon
involved a state common law claim for damages on the grounds that an
employee was wrongfully discharged in order to prevent his attainment of
benefits under an ERISA pension plan. Id. The court held that such an action
was preempted under ERISA because of its failure to "relate to" an employee
benefit plan, and because allowing states to develop different substantive
standards for wrongful discharge would create the lack of uniformity that the
preemption clause of ERISA was designed to prevent. Id.
49 ROSENBLA'T, supra note 1, at 161. The impact of the preemption clause
on participants is beyond the scope of this Note. For a detailed discussion on the
impact of preemption and the implications of federal common law developments
in this area. See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 631; Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein,
Closing the Gap: Safeguarding Participants'Rights by Expanding the Federal
Common Law of ERISA, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 671 (1994).
47
48
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disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of
financial information with respect thereto, by establishing
standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for
fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing
appropriate remedies, sanctions and ready access to
courts.5 °

ERISA imposes these procedural and administrative requirements
in an effort to safeguard the rights of participants and beneficiaries
in employee benefit plans.5" In addition, the access and remedies
provisions contained in ERISA serve to provide participants with
a mechanism to assure that their benefit expectations will be
fulfilled.52
ERISA contains four general sets of provisions to accomplish
these goals with respect to employer sponsored health benefit plans.
The first set of provisions impose informational requirements on
employers in an effort to provide participants with notice and
reward their benefit expectations.53 These provisions contain
detailed reporting and disclosure requirements designed to give
plan participants full information regarding their rights.54 For
example, ERISA requires a plan administrator to provide a
summary plan description ("SPD") to participants and beneficiaries.55 The SPD is considered to be the "key document in disputes

50

29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000).

"1See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113-114 (1989).
ERISA was enacted "to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans." Id. (quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463
U.S. 85, 90 (1983)).
52 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031(a); see also Conison, supra note 12,
at 2
(stating that the "central policy of [ERISAI is that employees should receive the
pensions and other benefits they were led to believe they would get. The statute
consists of preventative rules and standards, designed to ensure that benefit
expectations are well grounded and lessen the risk of disappointment"). See
generally Jay Conison, Foundations of the Common Law of Plans, 41 DEPAUL
L. REv. 575 (1992).
51 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031(a) (mandating the disclosure and regular
reporting of specific financial and benefit information to plan participants and
beneficiaries).
54 id.

" Id. § 1022(a)(1).
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over benefits entitlement., 56 Accordingly, the SPD must contain
certain information about the plan 57 and must "[b]e written in a
manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant,
and shall be accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such
participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under
the plan. 5 8 In addition, the SPD must provide the participants
with notice of their rights with respect to the plan's eligibility
requirements, benefits, and any circumstances that may result in
disqualification, ineligibility, or denial, loss, forfeiture, or suspension of benefits. 59 The overall purpose of the SPD is to provide
56

Edward B. Miller & Marc A. Dorenfeld, ERISA: Adequate Summary Plan

Descriptions, 14 HOUS. L. REv. 835 (1977).
17 See 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b).
ERISA provides that the SPD shall contain, among other information:
the name and type of administration of the plan; the name and address
of the person designated as agent for the service of legal process, if
such person is not the administrator; the name and address of the
administrator; names, titles, and addresses of any trustee or trustees (if
they are different from the administrator); a description of the relevant
provisions of any applicable collective bargaining agreement; the plan's
requirements respecting eligibility for participation and benefits; a
description of the provisions providing for nonforfeitable pension
benefits; the source of financing of the plan and the identity of any
organization through which benefits are provided; the date of the end
of the plan year and whether the records of the plan are kept on a
calender, policy, or fiscal year basis; the procedures to be followed in
presenting claims for benefits under the plan and the remedies
available under the plan for the redress of claims which are denied in
whole or in part (including procedures required under section 503 of
this Act).
Id.
58 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1) (2000). The SPD must be clear: It "does no good
unless an employee can read and digest it." As stated in Stahl v. Tony's Bldg.
Materials,Inc., 875 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1989):
[T]he regulations specify a large number of topics that a plan summary
description must cover ... [they] say little about what it must explain
in discussing each topic . ..These regulations reflect the reasonable

interpretation that descriptions must describe all aspects of the plan, but
must remain concise so that employees will read them.
Id.
'9See 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b).
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participants with adequate notice of the terms and conditions of the
plan in an attempt to meet the benefit expectations of the participants.6°
Second, ERISA contains standards governing plan fiduciaries
who exercise discretionary authority over the plan's management or
assets. 6' A fiduciary or plan administrator has the "authority to
control and manage the operation and administration of the
plan. 6 a Central to a fiduciary's duty is that they must provide a
full and fair review of denied claims. 63 ERISA establishes standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of
employee benefit plans vis-a-vis a number of substantive provisions. 64 Pursuant to these requirements, ERISA states that fiduciaries are obligated to discharge their duties with respect to the plan
65
solely in the interests of the participants and their beneficiaries
and are held to a "prudent man standard of care" in plan administration.66 With respect to the fiduciary's duty to review claims,
ERISA contains a proscription against arbitrary and capricious
benefit decisions by requiring that the "appropriate named fiduciary

6 Zanglein, supra note 49, at 680-81. Given the SPD's important role under
the ERISA framework, the SPD must be written comprehensibly in a manner a
reasonable participant would understand in order to be controlling. The terms of
the SPD take precedence over the incomprehensible, technical, terms of the
insurance policy itself. Reliance by participants creates a strong incentive to write
the SPD carefully and clearly and it gives beneficiaries an understandable
document on which they can rely. Zanglein, supra note 49, at 681.
61 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)-(B) (setting forth the basic administrative
and functional duties of a plan fiduciary). The terms "fiduciary" and "plan
administrator" are used synonymously. A plan administrator is a fiduciary if she
"has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan." Id. § 1002 (21)(A)(iii).
62 Id. § 1102(a)(1). Section 1102(a)(1) provides that "every employee benefit
plan shall be established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument. Such
instrument shall provide for one or more named fiduciaries who jointly or
severally shall have the authority to control and manage the operation and
administration of the plan." Id.
63 See id. § 1133(2).
64 See id. §§ 1002(a)(1), 1109, 1104.
65 Id. § 1109(a).
66 See id. § 1104(a)(1).
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provide a full and fair review of denied claims., 67 A plan administrator must provide claimants with a written notice of the reasons
for the denial of the claim and provide review procedures by which
a claimant may appeal a denial of benefits.68
Third, ERISA creates uniform remedial provisions for beneficiaries 69 and provides for sanctions to be levied against noncompliant plans.7° ERISA's civil enforcement
provisions limit a
participant's recovery to equitable relief.71 With respect to the plan

67

Id. §1133(2); see also Grossmuller v. Int'l Union, 715 F.3d 853 (3d Cir.

1983).
To afford a plan participant whose claim has been denied a reasonable
opportunity for full and fair review, the plan's fiduciary must consider
any and all pertinent information reasonably available to him. The
decision must be supported by substantial evidence. The fiduciary must
notify the participant promptly, in writing and in language likely to be
understood by laymen, that the claim has been denied with the specific
reasons therefor. The fiduciary must also inform the participant of what
evidence he relied upon and provide him with an opportunity to
examine that evidence and to submit written comments or rebuttal
documentary evidence. If the fiduciary allows third parties to appear
personally, the same privilege must be extended to the participant.
Grossmuller, 715 F.3d at 857-58.
68 See 29 U.S.C. § 1133(1) (indicating that the written notice must provide
"specific reasons" for denial and be "written in a manner calculated to be
understood by the participant"); Id. § 1133(2) (explaining that a plan must
provide claimants with a "reasonable opportunity ... for a full and fair hearing
by the appropriate named fiduciary of a decision denying the claim").
69 See id. § 1132(a) (indicating remedies provided by the civil enforcement
provision of ERISA are limited to equitable relief).
'0 See id. § 1132(l)-(m) (imposing "civil penalites on violations by
fiduciaries" and penalties for improper plan distributions).
71 See, e.g., Pilot Life v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (rejecting any ERISA
remedies for mental distress, punitive damages or state common law bad faith
claims against the insurance company, holding that ERISA's remedies preempt
state law and are limited to equitable relief); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,
473 U.S. 134 (1985) (rejecting claims for compensatory or punitive damages and
holding that the remedies provided in Section 1132 (a)(1)(B) were solely for the
benefit of the plan as opposed to the rights of beneficiaries); Mertens v. Hewitt
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993) (holding that no damages were recoverable under
the Act and that advisors and consultants who may wrongfully participate in plan
activities, and/or a fiduciary's breach, were immune from suit).
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administrators, ERISA sets forth criminal penalties for anyone who
willfully violates any of ERISA's reporting and disclosure requirements.72

Last, ERISA provides beneficiaries with private rights of action
and ready access to the federal court system in an effort to recover
benefits and reward participants with reasonable expectations of
coverage.73 Section 1132 (a)(1)(B) sets forth one of the basic
remedies provided by Congress by providing participants and
beneficiaries with the right to recover benefits owed under an
employee benefit plan.74

The purpose of the substantive provisions, as evidenced by the
text and legislative history, is to safeguard the rights of participants
and beneficiaries in employee welfare benefit plans. However,
judicial interpretation of these substantive provisions as well as the
federal common law developed by the courts has narrowed the
scope of protection by favoring a deferential abuse of discretion
standard of review and by limiting the scope of available remedies.75 As a result, ERISA's dual purposes of participant protection
72

29 U.S.C. § 1131.

Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Section 1132 (a) of ERISA in pertinent part provides:
"A civil action may be brought (1) by a participant or beneficiary (b) to recover
benefits due to him under the terms of the plan, to enforce his rights under the
terms of the plan, or to cl clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of
the plan." Id.
74 Id. § 1132.
71 See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54.
The detailed provisions of [ERISA's] civil enforcement scheme
represent a careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims
settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the
formation of employee benefit plans. The policy choices reflected in
the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others under the
federal scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA plan
participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state
law that Congress rejected in ERISA.
Id. The weaknesses and limitations of ERISA's remedial provisions are beyond
the scope of this Note. For detailed discussions of the remedial inhibitions of
ERISA and the failure of the federal common law to protect participants rights.
See Randall Gingliss, The ERISA Foxtrot: CurrentJurisprudenceTakes One Step
Forward and One Step Back in Protecting Participants'Rights, 18 VA. TAX
REV. 417 (1998); Zanglein, supra note 49, at 671.
71
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and consistency in plan interpretation and administration are
subverted.
C. The Evolution of a Standard of Review Under ERISA
A participant whose claim has been wrongfully denied can
bring a suit under ERISA Section 1132 (a)(1)(B) to attempt to
recover a benefit that is due under the plan.76 ERISA provides
that "a civil action may be brought by a participant or beneficiary
to recover benefits due to him under the terms of the plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan., 77 Although
the statutory text explicitly provides for judicial review of denial
of benefit claims, ERISA is silent about which standard of review
federal courts should use when reviewing denial of plan benefits. 78 Legislative history shows that Congress intended courts to
fill the gaps and interpret the silences of ERISA by developing "a
federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA
regulated plans."'7 9
In early ERISA cases, courts borrowed the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review from cases reviewing decisions by
administrators of pension plans set up under the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). 80 Federal courts justified this

See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); see also Brauch, supra note 3, at 573
(reviewing federal common law decisions that have held that before filing a
Section 1132 (a)(1)(B) suit for the recovery of denied benefits, a participant or
beneficiary must first seek benefits directly from the plan trustee under the
internal claim procedures set forth in the plan. Only if the trustee denies the
claim may the participant or beneficiary seek judicial review by the federal
76

courts).
" 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).

See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989);
Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 987 F.2d 1017, 1021 (4th Cir.
1993) (en banc).
" Firestone,489 U.S. at 110 (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 56 (1987)). "A
body of federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with
issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans."
120 CONG. REc. 29, 942 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (statement of Sen. Javits).
80 29 U.S.C. § 186 (2000); see also Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109.
78
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approach on the grounds that "because Congress intentionally
drafted ERISA's fiduciary duty provisions to be similar to the
fiduciary provisions set forth in the earlier LMRA, the 'arbitrary
and capricious' or abuse of discretion standard used there was
appropriate for reviewing benefit denials by ERISA fiduciaries. 81
The application of this standard by the federal courts led to the
adoption of a number of substantive legal rules regulating ERISA
that served to undermine Congress' intent to safeguard patients'
rights.82
Under an abuse of discretion standard, the court's review is
confined to the information or "record" at the time the decision
was made and the issue under examination is whether the decision
was "unreasonable" or "clearly erroneous" in light of the evidence
presented.83 Judicial deference to the decision of a plan administrator sharply increases a claimant's disadvantage because a plan
administrator's decision will be "upheld if it was within [its]
authority, reasoned and supported by substantial evidence in the
record." 84
This approach was followed by all twelve circuits until 1989,

81

Bayles v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund,

602 F.2d 97, 99-100 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979). But see Paul O'Neil, Protecting ERISA
Health Care Claimants: Practical Assessment of a Neglected Issue in Health
Care Reform, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 747 (1994) (suggesting that the adoption of
the LMRA standard to ERISA plans failed to account for a significant difference
between the two types of plans). LMRA plans are joint employer-employee
plans, in which the impartiality of the administrator has been assured, and
judicial deference makes sense. In ERISA plans, by contrast, because the
impartiality of the administrator is not assured, there is no basis for deference to
the administrator's decision. Id.
812
See Buenman v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension
Fund, 572 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of review is applicable to cases arising under ERISA); see
also Flint, supra note 11, at 961 (suggesting that the misapplication of labor law
principles to ERISA led federal courts to adopt and follow substantive rules that
thwart recovery by many-perhaps deserving participants).
83

ROSENBLATT, supra note 1, at 160.

' ROSENBLATT, supra note 1, at 216 (stating that the arbitrary and
capricious standard is a standard that only requires the use of one of many
logical reasons and some minimal documentation to confirm the administrator's
decision).
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when the Supreme Court explicitly disapproved of the use of the
LMRA approach in ERISA cases.85 In the landmark case, Firestone Tire & Rubber Company v. Bruch,86 the Supreme Court set
forth a new standard of judicial review based on principles of trust
law. 87 Recognizing that "trust principles make a deferential
standard of review appropriate when a trustee exercises discretionary powers, 88 the Court held that a "denial of benefits challenged
under section 1132 (a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed de novo unless the
benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary the discretionary
authority to determine the eligibility of benefits or to construe the
terms of the plan., 89 The Court determined that the decision to
grant deference to an administrator's decision depends solely on
whether the plan instrument contains language that reserves
discretionary authority to the administrator.90 The Court reasoned
that a de novo standard of review was appropriate in ERISA denial
of benefit cases since the de novo standard has been applied in
judicial benefit determinations prior to ERISA, 9' and any lesser
standard of review "would afford less protection to employees and
their beneficiaries than they enjoyed before ERISA was enacted." 92 The Court concluded by noting that such a result would be
inconsistent with the clear purposes of ERISA.9 3
By relying on the language contained in the plan as the basis

85

Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109 (concluding that the importation of arbitrary

and capricious standard developed under the LMRA into ERISA was unwarranted).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 111; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959)
("[W]here discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect to the exercise of
power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court except to prevent an
abuse by the trustee of his discretion.").
89 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
90 Id. (determining that a plan confers discretion on the administrator to
review claims based not on principles of trust law such as a fiduciary's conflict
of interest or the lack of impartiality, but simply on whether the language in the
plan gave the administrator discretionary authority).
9' Id. at 112-14.
92 Id. at 112.
" ld. at 114.
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for determining the standard of review, the Supreme Court in
Firestone set the stage for the problems that exist today. 94 Firestone requires that there be a grant of discretion to the administrator before such decision will be given the deference of the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review.95 However, lower courts have
struggled with the issue of the particular language that is necessary
to trigger a de novo review.96 In construing the appropriate
standard of review for denial of benefit cases, a number of federal
circuit courts have interpreted the type of language necessary to
vest discretion in benefit plans in ways that have effectively
undermined both of ERISA's twin aims.97
ERISA was enacted to provide a uniform system of rules and
regulations and to "promote the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries in employee benefit plans. 98 However, the tendency
of federal courts to imply discretion from ambiguous language
contained in the plan serves to promote a standard of review that
affords less protection to plan participants and more protection to
employers. 99 Under this approach, employers and plans can use

9 See O'Neil, supra note 81, at 749.
By holding that a deferential review of ERISA benefit decisions turns
on the particular language of a plan rather than questions of conflict of
interest, bias, and lack of impartiality on the part of the plan administrator, [Firestone] seriously undermined the purpose of ERISA even as
the Court affirmed that ERISA was intended to "promote the interests
of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans."
O'Neil, supra note 81, at 749; see also Firestone,489 U.S. at 113.
" Firestone,489 U.S. at 115.
96 See Gust v. Coleman, 936 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that decisions
throughout the circuits are far from uniform regarding the particular language
that is necessary to confer discretion in the plan).
9' See infra Part II (discussing the split among the circuits).
9' Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90, 100 (1983) (stating that
ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to further the interests of employees
and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans).
9 See, e.g., O'Bryhim v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 98-1472, 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 19232, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 16, 1999)(per curiam)(holding
that the plain meaning of the plan language conferred discretion upon the plan
administrators to make all determinations about benefit eligibility); Perez v.
Aetna Life Ins.Co., 150 F.3d 550, 557 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that the plan
language -[Aetna] shall have the "right to require as part of the proof of the
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vague language to insulate themselves from a more rigorous
standard of review.'0° As a result, employees who are denied
promised benefits also lose the benefit of judicial review because
their employer reserved discretionary power to itself without
making that reservation clear.'O° Such an interpretation of ambiguous plan language fails to reward the participants' expectations,
leading to a result contrary to congressional intent. Moreover, the
circuit split over the type of language that suffices to vest discretion in the plan demonstrates a lack of national uniformity and
consistency. 0 2 "Frequent lawmaking by the various circuit courts
and district courts poses a threat to ERISA's goal of uniformity.
The prospect of disuniformity remains especially disquieting for
businesses with national plans and multi-state operations that can
expect to be sued in many different federal forums."'0 3 As a

result of the disunity among the federal courts, plan administrators
and participants are faced with different laws and regulations
depending on the jurisdiction.
The federal common law standard of review for denial of
benefit cases is de novo, unless the plan explicitly confers authority

claim satisfactory evidence"- requires an arbitrary and capricious standard of
review); Donato v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 1994)
(holding that the language "all proof must be satisfactory to us" was sufficient
to warrant a deferential arbitrary and capricious review of the administrator's
denial).
" Bogue v. Ampex Corp., 976 F.2d 1319, 1325 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that where a plan unambiguously granted discretion to the plan administrator to
make factual determinations, beneficiaries had sufficient notice that the plan
administrator had discretion to determine eligibility of benefits).
101Id.
102

Kinstler v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243, 251 (2d

Cir. 1999) (noting that appellate judges are divided on the issue of what language
suffices to convey plan administrators the discretionary authority that warrants
the more deferential arbitrary and capricious standard of review).
113 Singer v. Black & Decker Corp., 964 F.2d 1449, 1453 (4th Cir. 1992)
(Wilkinson, J., concurring) (noting that ERISA's preemption provision was
designed to avoid conflicting employer obligations and variable standards of
recovery under various state laws and prevent disunity among the circuits, in part
because of the significant problem that varying standards present to companies
with a national presence across many jurisdictions).
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upon the plan administrator to review denial of benefit claims.'O°
However, judicial resolution of the type of language necessary to
confer discretionary authority upon the plan administrator is
counterproductive to ERISA's underlying protective policies of
protecting participants' rights and promoting uniformity. By using
a de novo standard as the default standard and implying discretion
in vague and ambiguous language, courts afford less protection to
beneficiaries and more protection to employers and plan adminis05
trators.
II. THE CmcuI SPLIT
The Supreme Court, in Firestone Tire & Rubber Company v.
Bruch, held that "a denial of benefits challenged under section
1132 (a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless
the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary
authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the
terms of the plan."' 1 6 Pursuant to Firestone, a court's choice of
the standard of review is itself a question of contract interpretation. ' As a result, a determination of the appropriate standard
of review in ERISA denial of benefit claims rests upon particular
language contained in a plan, and upon federal common law
methods of contract interpretation such as "plain meaning" 10 8and
"contra proferentem."'0 9 One issue that courts have struggled

"oFirestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
See, e.g., Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 558, 561 (6th Cir. 1998)
(Boggs, J., dissenting).
106489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (holding that a de novo standard of review will
not be applied under current ERISA jurisprudence unless a plan fails to give an
administrator discretion to make benefit determinations).
'07 See Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1254 (1993) (citing
Firestone,489 U.S. at 111).
18 See, e.g., Perez, 150 F.3d at 557 (relying on general principles of contract
interpretation to interpret the plans provisions according to their plain meaning,
in an ordinary and popular sense); Pitcher v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 93
F.3d 407, 411 (7th Cir. 1996) (interpreting ERISA plans "in an ordinary and
popular sense as would a person of average intelligence and experience")
(quoting Meredith v. Allsteel Inc., 11 F.3d 1354, 1358 (7th Cir. 1993)).
"09 Contra proferentem means "against the party who proffers or puts
105
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with in cases after Firestone concerns uncertainty as to the kind of
plan language that is sufficient to grant plan administrators the
discretionary authority to warrant a more deferential review." °
This split among the circuits over the appropriate standard of
review in denial of benefit cases frustrates ERISA's dual purpose
of protecting participants rights and providing a uniform body of
law to govern employee welfare benefit plans.
A reviewing court determines, de novo, whether the ERISA
plan confers discretionary authority on the administrator, and if so,
whether the administrator abused that discretion."' The burden
is on the administrator to show that the plan gives them discretionary authority." 2 If the administrator meets this burden, then the
court will defer to the administrator's decision." 3 The circuits are
split over the specific language that is necessary to invoke a
deferential standard of review. Although the plan language in most
denial of benefit cases appears to be linguistically similar, the split
between the circuits requiring express discretion-granting language
versus those that are willing to imply discretion despite the
presence of ambiguous plan language, is reflective of divergent
policy choices made by the courts." 4 The main problem underlying the circuit split is that different circuits have conflicting views
forward a thing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 327 (6th ed. 1990); See Kinstler
v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243, 251 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding that ambiguities in plan language will be resolved against the plan and
the employer because the power to draft clear language rests with them);
Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(holding that three reasonable interpretations of the plan term "satisfactory...
proof' were reasonable and resolved ambiguity against the plan); Heasley, 2 F.3d
at 1257 (utilizing the principle of contra proferentem: "if after applying the
normal principles of contractual construction, [an] insurance contract is fairly
susceptible of two different interpretations ... the interpretation that is most
favorable to the insured will be adopted.") (quoting Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life
Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 539 (1994)).
"' See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
".. Heasley, 2 F.3d at 1258.
112

Kearney, 175 F.3d at 1088.

113Id.
114

ROSENBLATr, supra note

1, at 196 (discussing judicial interpretation of

enforcement of benefit and preemption cases reflect a struggle over two visions
of ERISA).
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as to the primary purpose of ERISA." 5 One approach views the
primary goal of ERISA as improving the protection of employees'
interests and accordingly reads the statute as authorizing the courts
to incorporate and expand state doctrines regarding trusts and
insurance contracts as part of the federal common law of ERISA.1 16 The other approach views ERISA's primary purpose as
encouraging employers to voluntarily offer benefit plans by limiting
employers' liability, and maximizing their discretion. 117 Although
both views have merit, the latter fails to comport with ERISA's
twin aims of safeguarding participants' rights and promoting
uniformity throughout the system." 8
A. Frameworkfor Analysis
As a result of the conflicting rationales underlying ERISA's

purpose, the circuits are split over the tenets of contract interpretation they apply in order to determine the type of language that
triggers the deferential abuse of discretion review. Although
Firestone establishes that a clear grant of discretion to determine
eligibility of benefits or to construe terms of the plan is necessary
before a plan administrator's decision will be given the deference
of an arbitrary and capricious review,119 lower courts have
115

ROSENBLATr, supra note 1, at 196; see Brauch, supra note 3, at 548 n.25

the legislative history of ERISA reflects an attempt by Congress to
competing interests of protecting individual plan participants and
administrative burdens) (citing S. Rep. No. 93-127 at 12 (1974),
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4844).
116 ROSENBLATr, supra note 1, at 196.

(noting that
balance the
minimizing
reprinted in

117ROSENBLATT, supra note 1, at 196; see also H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 9

(1973) (revealing that according to legislative history, ERISA is not completely
one-sided, as Congress sought to balance the need to protect employee benefits
with "the interests of employers and labor organizations in maintaining flexibility
in the design and operation of their pension programs"); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755
F.2d 708, 714 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that "one of the goals of ERISA was to
keep plans within reasonable costs" and suggesting that if conditions became too
difficult or expensive under ERISA, employers would be discouraged from
creating plans).
118

See supra Part I.B (discussing the legislative history and the underlying

purposes of ERISA).

"9 Firestone,489 U.S. at 114-15.

DENIAL OF BENEFIT CLAIMS

529

interpreted "clear" to mean much less than the word suggests.121
The circuit courts have ruled that the language necessary to vest
discretion in a plan administrator to determine benefit eligibility, or
to construe the terms of the plan, may be embodied in a variety of
forms. 21 The variations among plan language and the approaches
to plan interpretation reflect the courts'
differing approaches to the
22
underlying purposes of ERISA.1
The first category of cases requires language that explicitly
vests discretion in the plan administrator to make benefit determinations or construe the terms of the plan. 123 Although, the courts
that have adopted this standard require explicit language, they still
do not require the use of "magic words" such as "discretion" or24
"deference to" to vest authority in the plan administrator.
However, these courts require an explicit grant of discretion or its
functional equivalent in order to invoke an arbitrary and capricious
standard of review. '251In addition, these courts have implemented
the use of the common law doctrine of contra proferentem when
construing ambiguous plan language in an attempt to comport with
126
ERISA's protective policy of safeguarding participants' rights.
120See, e.g., Perez, 150 F.3d at 557.
121Michael A. de Freitas, Annotation, JudicialReview

of Denial of Health

Care Benefits Under Employee Benefit Plan Governed by Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA)(29 U.S. C.A. 1132 (a)(1)(B))-Post-FirestoneCases,
128 A.L.R. FED. 1, 2a (1999)).
122 ROSENBLATT, supra note 1, at 196.
123 There is no basis for distinguishing between questions of benefit
determinations and plan interpretation when determining the proper standard of
review. Govindarajan v. FMC Corp., 932 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1991) (Manion,
J., concurring) (noting that the rationale underlying Firestone was based "on
whether the written terms of the plan confer discretion on the administrator, and
not on the type of decision-factual or interpretive-that the administrator is
rendering.") (quoting Petrilli v. Dreschsel, 910 F.2d 1441, 1446 (7th Cir. 1990).
124 See, e.g., Kinstler v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d
243,
251 (2d Cir. 1999); Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir.
1999).
125 See, e.g., Kinstler, 181 F.3d at 251; Kearney, 175 F.3d at 1089; Bounds
v. Bell Atlantic, 32 F.3d 337, 339 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that the proper way to
secure deferential language is through express-discretion-granting language).
126 See, e.g., Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1257 (3d
Cir.
1993) (finding the terms at issue were ambiguous and could be read in two
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The other category of cases demonstrates the willingness of some
courts to imply a grant of discretion despite the presence of
ambiguous plan language in order to incentivize employers to
provide such benefits.127 These courts utilize the plain meaning
rule of contract interpretation and fail to comport with the
legislative intent of Congress.128
1. Pro-ParticipantCircuits
The circuits in this category require that benefit plans contain
express discretion-granting language or its functional equivalent in
order to vest discretion with the plan administrator to determine
benefits and interpret the terms of the plan. These circuits have the
highest standards for the language necessary to confer discretion to
the plan and comport most with the underlying purpose of
ERISA.' 29 These courts do not however require that a plan
contain "magic words" such as "discretion" and "deference to" a
plan administrator in order to invoke a de novo review. 30 Al-

different ways, the court utilized the federal common law of contract interpretation contraproferentem to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the insured).
127 See, e.g., Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 550, 557 (6th Cir. 1998);
Donato v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 1994).
128

See Donato, 19 F.3d at 382.

129

See Bounds, 32 F.3d at

339 (stating that the proper way to secure

deferential language is through express-discretion-granting language, such as "as
determined" and "all proof must be satisfactory to us"); Ganton Techs. Inc. v.
Nat'l Indus. Group Pension Plan, 76 F.3d 462, 466 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding a plan
administrator's interpretation of a plan's terms was accorded an arbitrary and
capricious review because the plan explicitly stated that the trustees had the
authority to "resolve disputes and ambiguities relating to the interpretation of the
plan"). But see Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 550, 558 (6th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the less rigorous phrase "satisfactory proof of total disability" was
sufficient to preclude de novo review); Patterson v. Caterpillar Inc., 70 F.3d 503
(7th Cir. 1995) (stating the phrase "such due proof as shall be required"
sufficient to vest discretion in the plan).
130 Kinstler, 181 F.3d at 251-52 (holding that the administrator's burden to
demonstrate insulation from de novo review requires either language stating that
the award of benefits is within the discretion of the plan administrator or
language that is plainly the functional equivalent of such wording) (citing Jordan
v. Retirement Comm. of Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 46 F.3d 1264, 1271 (2d
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though explicit discretion-granting language is preferred, the
functional equivalent of such language is sufficient to reserve
interpretive discretion to the plan.' In addition to having a high
standard for the language necessary to reserve discretion in the
plan, these circuits resolve ambiguities in plan language contra
adopting
proferentem in favor of the plan participant. The courts
13 4
33
3
Eighth
these stringent standards are the Second, ' Third,'
and Ninth' 35 Circuits. The overall approach taken by these courts

comports with ERISA's underlying policy of protecting participants'
rights and expectations by providing them with adequate notice of
their benefits.
a.

Explicit Grant of Discretion or Functional Equivalent

The requirement of express discretion-granting language was
announced by the Eighth Circuit in Bounds v. Bell Atlantic.'3 6
Bounds considered whether the language contained in the plan's
proof-of-loss provision stating that "claims will be paid 'after the
[insurance company] receives adequate proof of loss"' was
sufficient to trigger a deferential standard of review.'37 The court

Cir. 1995)).
131 Id.
132

Id. at 251 (holding that ambiguities in plan language will not be sufficient

to vest discretionary authority to the plan administrator, and such ambiguities will
be resolved against the plan and the employer because the power to draft clear
language rests with them).
'31 See, e.g., Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1257 (3d Cir.
1993) (finding the terms at issue were ambiguous and could be read in two
different ways, the court utilized the federal common law of contract interpretation contra proferentem to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the insured).
134 See, e.g., Delk v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 104, 105-06 (8th Cir.
1992) (upholding the application of contraproferentem in an ERISA case where
the language remains ambiguous after interpreting the language as would an
average plan participant).
" See, e.g., Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that where the language reserving discretion to the plan was not
explicit and three reasonable interpretations of the plan term "satisfactory ...
proof' were plausible, the court resolved the ambiguity against the plan).
136 32 F.3d 337 (8th Cir. 1994).
SId. at 339 (emphasis added).
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held that the terms contained in the insurance company's proof of
loss provision "read like a typical insurance policy" and "[did] not
trigger the deferential ERISA standard review"' 3 8 because the
provision did not contain explicit discretion-granting language
reserving the right of the plan administrator to make benefit
eligibility determinations or to construe the terms of the plan.139
The court cited language - including "as determined by us"'1 40 or
' - as
"all proof must be satisfactory to us"141
language it considered to be explicit discretion-granting language warranting a
deference to a plan administrator's decisions. 4 2 The courts
interpretation in this case evidences that express discretion-granting
language is the proper way to secure a deferential review of an
143
ERISA plan administrator's claim in the Eighth Circuit.
The Second Circuit, in Kinstler v. First Reliance StandardLife
Insurance'44 articulated a standard for the type of language
required to preclude a de novo review. The court stated that:
[N]o one word or phrase must always be used to confer
discretionary authority, the administrator's burden to
demonstrate insulation from de novo review requires either
language stating that the award of benefits is within the
discretion of the plan administrator or language that is
145
plainly the functional equivalent of such wording.
In articulating this standard the court recognized that "magic words
Brown v. Seitz Foods Inc., 140 F.3d 1198, 1200 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Ravenscraft v. Hy-Vee Employee Benefit Plan & Trust 85 F.3d 398, 402 n.2 (8th
Cir. 1996)).
139 id.
'40 Finley v. Special Agents Mut. Benefit Ass'n, 957 F.2d 617, 620-621 (8th
Cir. 1992) (holding that the language "as determined by us" contained in a
benefit eligibility clause was the functional equivalent of express discretiongranting language).
141 Donato v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 375, 377
(7th Cir. 1994) (stating
that the language in the plan stating that disability benefits would be paid when
Met Life received proof of a claim, and that "[aill proof must be satisfactory to
us" was sufficient to preclude de novo review).
142 Bounds v. Bell Atlantic, 32 F.3d 337, 339 (8th Cir. 1994).
138

143 Id.
144
141

Kinstler, 181 F.3d at 243.
Id. at 252 (emphasis added).
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such as 'discretion' and 'deference' may not be 'absolutely
necessary' to avoid a de novo standard of review."'' 4 6 The Second
Circuit deems the arbitrary and capricious standard applicable in
cases where the language reserving discretion was the functional
equivalent of express discretion-granting language.' 47 For example, in Ganton Technologies Inc. v. National Industrial Group
Pension Plan,'48 the court reasoned that since the plan explicitly
provided that the trustees had the authority to "resolve all disputes
and ambiguities relating to the interpretation of the plan," the
149
deferential arbitrary and capricious standard was appropriate.
Similarly, in Zuckerbrod v. Phoenix Mutual Life, 5° the use of the
phrase "in our judgment" to modify a clause relating to the
determination of benefits was also found sufficient to preclude a de
novo review.'' The Second Circuit interpreted these unambiguous phrases to be the functional equivalent of express discretiongranting language, thus making the arbitrary and capricious
52
standard applicable to the plan administrator's decision.
The requirement of express discretion-granting language or its
functional equivalent utilized by the circuits in this category should
serve as a model for statutory reform, for these criteria comport
most with ERISA's purpose of safeguarding participants' rights by
requiring plans to provide express notice of its authority. 53 In
addition, this approach is consistent with Firestone's requirement
"that there be a grant of discretion to the administrator before [a
plan administrator's] decision will be given the deference of an

146

Id. at 251 (citing Jordan v. Retirement Comm. of Rensselaer Polytechnic

Inst., 46 F.3d 1264, 1271 (2d Cir. 1995)).
147Id.
148

76 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 1996).

149Id.

at 466 (holding that a trustee's interpretation of an employee welfare
benefit plan's "transfer of asset" provision was accorded deference because the
plan explicitly provided that the trustees had the authority to "resolve all disputes
and ambiguities relating to the interpretation of the plan").
150 78 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1996).
' Id. at 48 (determining that where a policy used the language "in our
judgment" to modify a determination of benefits, a plan administrator's decision
will only be overturned if the decision is arbitrary and capricious).
152 id.
'13 See supra Part I.B (discussing ERISA's notice provisions).
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'arbitrary and capricious' standard of review."'' 54 Therefore, the
requirement of express discretion-granting language or its functional equivalent should serve as the basis for any legislative action
toward resolving a standard of review for ERISA denial of benefit
claims.
b.

Contra Proferentem: Resolving Ambiguities in Favor of
Plan Participants

In addition to the high standards set for the type of language
that is necessary to preclude a de novo review, the courts in this
category frequently use the contract maxim of contra proferentem
to resolve ambiguities in a plan's discretion-granting language in
favor of the participants. 155 A resolution of the ambiguous terms
in favor of the participants results in a de novo review of the
administrator's record. 5 6 The principle of contra proferentem is
derived from the recognition that:
Insurance policies are almost always drafted by specialists
employed by the insurer. In light of the drafters' expertise
and experience, the insurer should be expected to set forth
any limitations on its liability enough for a common
layperson to understand; if it fails to do this, it should not
be allowed to take advantage of the very ambiguities that
it could have prevented with greater diligence. Moreover,
once the policy language has been drafted, it is usually not
subject to amendment by the insured, even if he sees an
ambiguity; an insurers' practice of forcing the insured to
guess and hope regarding the scope of coverage requires

"54 Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. 150 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 1998) (Boggs, J.
dissenting) (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)).
"' See, e.g., Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir.
1999); Kinstler, 181 F.3d at 251; Heasley, 2 F.3d at 1254-55; Delk v. Durham
Life Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 104, 105 (8th Cir. 1992).
156 See Heasley, 2 F.3d at 1257 (finding the term at issue was ambiguous
and could be read in two different ways). As a result, the court utilized the
federal common law rule of contract interpretation, contraproferentem to resolve
the ambiguity in favor of the insured, thereby making a de novo review
appropriate. Id. at 1254-1255.
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that any doubts be resolved in favor of the party who has
been placed in such a predicament.'57
Many courts have upheld the use of the common law contract
rule of contra proferentem in ERISA cases.' 58 Contra proferentern has been used in cases where "if, after applying the normal
principles of contractual construction, '[an] insurance contract is

fairly susceptible to two different interpretations, the interpretation
that is most favorable to the insured will be adopted.""

59

Further-

more, courts have upheld the application of contra proferentem in
ERISA cases where language remains ambiguous after interpreting
the language as an "average plan participant" would.' 6° The rules'
central rationale is that "un-negotiated contract terms and unequal
bargaining power between parties demands that the law tip
interpretation against the more sophisticated insurer, and in favor
of the insured."' 6 ' The courts that use this method of interpreta-

Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 539 (9th Cir. 1990).
Finding the term "mental illness" to be ambiguous on a plain reading of the
policy, the court applied the rule of contra proferentem against the insurance
company, Benefit Trust. Id. at 540.
158 See supra note 109 (discussing the application of the federal common law
doctrine of contra proferentem). In addition, courts have held that the "adoption
of contra proferentem does not violate ERISA's pre-emption clause." Heasley,
2 F.3d at 1258; see also Mark Traynor, Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Insurance
Co.: Protecting Employees Under ERISA by ConstruingAmbiguous Plan Terms
Against the Insurer, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1219, 1237 (1993) (suggesting that the
Kunin court properly held that the contra proferentem rule was not preempted
by ERISA). The proper focus of preemption is on whether Congress. intended
preemption. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987). The Kunin
court was correct in implying that Congress did not intend to provide less
protection to an insured than he enjoyed under state common law prior to the
passage of ERISA. Kunin, 910 F.2d at 540.
"9 Kunin, 910 F.2d at 539 (quoting A. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND
DISPUTES § 6.02, 281-82 (2d ed. 1988)).
'60 See Delk, 959 F.2d at 105.
16' Traynor, supra note 158, at 1220 (1993) (stating that un-negotiated
contract terms and unequal bargaining power between parties requires that the
contract be construed against the party that drafted the contract) (citing Stephen
M. Hoke, Contract Interpretationin Commercial InsuranceDisputes: The Status
of the Sophisticated Insured Exception and Alternatives to the Ambiguity Rule,
40 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 259, 261 (1990)).
157
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tion comport most with ERISA's legislative intent of safeguarding
participants' rights and rewarding benefit expectations.
The Ninth Circuit took a similar approach in deciding these
questions in Kearney v. Standard Insurance Company.'62 Consistent with the other circuits in this category, the Ninth Circuit
requires that discretion to determine eligibility of benefits or to
construe the terms of the plan must be "unambiguously retained"
in the plan instrument. 63 In the event that the terms are ambiguous about whether discretion is conferred to the administrator, the
court resolves ambiguities in favor of the insured by precluding an
arbitrary and capricious review."6 In Kearney, the Ninth Circuit
sitting en banc was called upon to review a plan administrator's
decision to terminate disability benefits of a plan participant in a
group disability insurance policy.1 65 The policy stated that Standard Insurance would pay disability benefits "upon satisfactory
written proof that you have become disabled. 1 66 The court
examined the plan language to determine whether it conferred
discretion upon Standard Insurance to decide whether a claimant is
disabled. 167 The majority of the court reasoned that the language
the plan administrator claimed granted him discretion was ambiguous because at least three interpretations of the plan language were
reasonable. 168 The court engaged in an explanation of each of
these interpretations in order to illustrate that each was reasonable,
and to ultimately prove that the language was ambiguous as to

175 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
Bogue v. Ampex Corp., 976 F.2d 1319, 1325 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that where the plan grants the administrator the authority to evaluate and
determine facts, this is sufficient evidence of a grant of discretionary authority).
In Bogue, the language in the plan was unambiguous and provided beneficiaries
with notice that the plan administrator had such discretion over the determining
eligibility of benefits in light of the terms of the plan. Id. at 1325.
'(4Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1086, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999)
(affirming the lower courts decision that "the review should be de novo because
the policy was ambiguous about whether discretion was conferred to the
administrator").
165 Id. at 1086.
166 Id. at 1087.
167 Id. at 1086-87.
162

163See

168 Id. at

1089-90.

DENIAL OF BENEFIT CLAIMS

537

whether discretion was conferred to the administrator.169 The
court reasoned that since there were three reasonable interpretations
for the phrase "satisfactory written proof," the policy was ambiguous about whether discretion was conferred to the administrator.170 The court held that since discretion was not "unambiguously retained,"'' 7 as required by the standard in the circuit, "ambiguities are construed contra proferentem, and ... ambiguities are
construed in favor of the insured."' 172 As a result, the plan administrator's decision was to be reviewed under a de novo stan73
dard. 1
The Second Circuit applied similar reasoning in Kinstler v.
First Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, 74 to arrive at
the determination that plan language requiring a claimant to
"submit[] satisfactoryproof... to us" was insufficient to preclude
169

Id. The court explained that one interpretation of the phrase "satisfactory

written proof' is a variation of an old insurance phrase that traditionally
conferred discretion on the insurance company to determine whether the proof
was sufficient. The word "satisfactory" was traditionally limited to an objective
standard. Thus, the insurance company could not reject proof that was
satisfactory to a reasonable person. Id. at 1089. The court found a second
plausible interpretation of "satisfactory written proof" by using fundamental rules
of contract interpretation. Id. at 1089. "[Wjhere a contract contains a condition
that the obligor be 'satisfied,' 'an interpretation is preferred under which the
condition occurs if ... a reasonable person in the position of the obligor would
be satisfied."' Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 228 (1981)).
The court recognized that such an analysis would result in the plan administrator
being limited to an objective standard, much like the first interpretation. Id. at
1090. A third reasonable construction is one that suggests a subjective standard
for the phrase "satisfactory written proof." Id. This interpretation suggests that
the plan administrator must be satisfied by the proof of the disability, thus
limiting the plan administrator's decision only by his fiduciary duties of good
faith and fair dealing. Id.
'70 Kearney, 175 F.3d at 1089-90.
171See Bogue, 976 F.2d at 1325 (holding that an administrator has discretion
to determine benefits only where discretion was "unambiguously retained." In
addition, the court upheld the use of contraproferentem where the plan language
was ambiguous).
172 Kearney, 175 F.3d at 1090 (citing Mongeluzo v. Baxter Traveno
Disability Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 942 (9th Cir. 1995)).
173 Id.
174

181 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1999).
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de novo review. 175 The court affirmed the district court's holding
that the de novo standard of review applies to all aspects of a
denial of an ERISA benefit claim in the absence of a clear
reservation of discretion to the plan administrator. 7 6 The key
issue was the denial of disability benefits based on a failure to
submit "satisfactory proof of 'Total Disability."' 177 The policy
provided monthly disability benefits if the claimant "submit[ed]
satisfactory proof'of total disability to First Reliance. 178 The
court held that an arbitrary and capricious review of the plan
administrator's decision was not warranted because the language in
the policy was subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. 179 The court stated that it was "unclear whether the key
language, requiring claimant to 'submit satisfactory proof to us'
meant that the claimant was required to submit proof to First
Reliance that is satisfactory, or that the claimant must submit proof
that is satisfactory to First Reliance." 180 The court stated that
since both interpretations were reasonable, and since a plan
administrator bears the burden of proving that the plan vests
discretion with her, any ambiguities must be resolved in favor of
the insured. 8 ' Relying on the opinion in Kearney, 82 the Second Circuit resolved the ambiguity in the plan language using the
171Id.
176

at 251-52.

Id. at 245.

177 Id.

"78 Id. "The policy provides monthly disability benefits if the insured is (1)
Totally Disabled as the result of a Sickness or Injury covered by this Policy; (2)
is under the regular care of a Physician; (3) has completed the Elimination

Period; and (4) submits satisfactory proof of Total Disability to [First Reliance]."
Id. at 246. The plan states that "'Totally Disabled' and 'Total Disability' mean
that as a result of an Injury or Sickness ...an Insured cannot perform the
material duties of his/her regular occupation." Id. at 245-46.
171Id. at 251. The Second Circuit required that the language conferring
discretion to determine benefit eligibility and construe the terms of the plan must
be explicit or language that is the 'functional equivalent' of an explicit grant of
discretion. Id. at 252.
180 id.

'81 Id. at 251-52.
Kearney, 175 F.3d at 1086 (affirming the lower court's decision that the
"review should be de novo because the policy was ambiguous about whether
discretion was conferred to the administrator").
182
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maxim of contra proferentem against First Reliance.1 83
The court in Kinstler also addressed the issue of notice and
rewarding participants' expectations of benefits.' 84 In dicta, the
court stated that the word "satisfactory" was insufficient to convey
notice that the plan administrator has discretion to determine
matters of benefit eligibility and plan interpretation. Judge Newman
opined that "every plan that is administered requires submission of
proof that [will] 'satisfy' the administrator.""15 "Thus, saying that
proof must be 'satisfactory to the administrator' merely states the
' 86
obvious point that the administrator is the decision-maker."'
The court further stated that unless a plan explicitly states that the
proof must be satisfactory to the plan administrator, "satisfactory
proof' should be construed objectively, as would a reasonable plan
participant, and not subjectively to the satisfaction of the administrator, thereby meeting the insured's reasonable expectations of
coverage. 187
The court concluded that, although 'magic words' such as
'discretion' and 'deference to' may not be 'absolutely necessary'
to avoid a de novo standard of review," the administrator had the
burden of establishing that the plan vested discretion with the plan
administrator. 88 However, the administrator's burden to demonstrate insulation must be met with clear, explicit language or the
"functional equivalent" of such wording reserving authority to the

183 Kinstler, 181 F.3d at 252.
184

Id.

185

Id.
Id. at 252.
Id. (stating that the word "satisfactory" is an inadequate way to convey

186

187

the idea that the plan administrator has discretion). But see O'Bryhim v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 98-1472, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19232, at *1, *13,
* 14 (4th Cir. Aug. 16, 1999) (holding that plan language "submits satisfactory
proof ... to us" conferred discretion to the plan to determine eligibility for
benefits); Perez, 150 F.3d at 554 (stating that the plan language, "satisfactory
evidence," was sufficient to warrant an arbitrary and capricious review despite
the fact that the plan did not specify to whom the satisfactory evidence must be
submitted).
188 Kinstler, 181 F.3d at 251 (citing Jordan v. Retirement Comm. of
Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 46 F.3d 1264, 1271 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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plan administrator. 89 Finally, willingness of some courts to apply
the principle of contra proferentem to ambiguous discretiongranting language comes from the recognition that the insurance
company drafts the plan, and is thus capable of including in its
policy "clear language" to assure a deferential review.19 °
The circuits in this category come closest to upholding the
"protective policies" underlying ERISA, by setting high standards
for the type of language necessary to preclude de novo review and
by resolving in favor of the participant." The application of
contra proferentem to ambiguous terms functions to ensure that
claims will be reviewed de novo. 192 The application of contra
proferentem to ERISA denial of benefit cases is consistent with the
congressional purposes of promoting the interests of employees and
beneficiaries and protecting all contractually defined benefits.' 93
The Second and Ninth Circuits also hold that notice is an essential
ERISA safeguard since ERISA requires that the SPD must be
written in such a way that participants understand their rights and
benefits. 194 The very fact that there is a vigorous debate about the

89

Id. at 252.

190Id.

" See, e.g., Kinstler, 181 F.3d at 251 (holding that ambiguities in plan
language will not be sufficient to vest discretionary authority to the plan
administrator, and such ambiguities will be resolved against the plan and the
employer because the power to draft clear language rests with them); Kearney
v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that where
the language reserving discretion to the plan was not explicit and three
reasonable interpretations of the plan term "satisfactory... proof' were plausible,
the court resolved the ambiguity against the plan); Heasley v. Belden & Blake
Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1257 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding the terms at issue were
ambiguous and could be read in two different ways, the court utilized the federal
common law of contract interpretation contra proferentem to resolve the
ambiguity in favor of the insured).
192 Kinstler, 181 F.3d 243 (holding that in the absence of a clear reservation
of discretion the de novo standard of review applies to all aspects of a denial of
benefits claim under ERISA). The other aspects of denial of claim benefits under
ERISA are beyond the scope of this Note.
'9'Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Conn. Inc., 936 F.2d 98, 107 (2d
Cir. 1991) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113114 (1989)).
'94See Stahl v. Tony's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 875 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir.
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syntax and semantics of the plan illustrates the ambiguity and the
problem of notice to plan beneficiaries.' 95 The high standards
required for plan language and the contra proferentem method of
interpretation is both consistent and complementary to Congress'
intent of safeguarding participants' rights and rewarding reasonable
benefit expectations, and should therefore serve as a benchmark for
legislative reform.
2.

Pro-Employer Circuits

Contrary to the approach taken by the first category of circuits
that require an explicit grant of discretion or a functional equivalent, these circuits have relaxed their standards for language that is
sufficient to vest discretion in the plan administrator. This expansive approach followed by the Fourth, 196 Sixth,' 97 and Seventh' 98 Circuits is at odds with congressional purposes of promoting the interests of employees and beneficiaries.' 99 The
circuits in this category rely on general principles of contract

1989) (holding the SPD must be clear). It "does no good unless an employee can
read and digest it." Id. The court in this case upheld the use of contra
proferentem in an ERISA case where the language was ambiguous after
interpreting the language as would an average plan participant. Id.
195 See Kinstler, 181 F.3d at 251; Kearney, 175 F.3d at 1089-90.
196 See O'Bryhim v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 98-1472, 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19232, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 16, 1999).
197 See Perez, 150 F.3d at 556-57 (relying on general principles of contract
interpretation to interpret plan provisions according to their plain meaning and
in an ordinary and popular sense).
198 See Pitcher v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 407, 411 (7th Cir.
1996) (interpreting ERISA plans "in an ordinary and popular sense as would a
person of average intelligence and experience").
'99 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000).
ERISA's purpose is "to protect ... the interests of participants in
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the
disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial
and other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of
conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee
benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and
ready access to federal courts."
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interpretation to interpret a plan's provisions according to their
"plain meaning," in an "ordinary and popular sense. '' 200 Characteristically, a "plain meaning rule" means that the court looks only
to the "four comers" of the document to find the meaning of the
provisions contained therein, and does not consider extrinsic
evidence, such as legislative intent and interpretations offered by
the parties.2"' As applied to employee health plans under ERISA,
a "plain meaning" approach fails to consider the legislative intent
of Congress in enacting ERISA. This approach has the effect of
undermining the twin aims of ERISA,2 °2 in that participants are
being afforded less rights and protections and the split amongst the
circuits defeats the uniformity objective. Furthermore, the less
stringent language requirement coupled with the application of the
"plain meaning" rule reflects a utilitarian policy choice by the
courts.2 °3 This approach reflects the courts' attempt to encourage
employers to provide health insurance for their employees by
according deference to the decisions of plan administrators. 2°
a. Implied Grant of Discretion Despite Ambiguous Plan
Language
The Firestone court stated that there must be a grant of
discretion to the administrator before such decision will be given
205
the deference of an arbitrary and capricious standard of review.
The Sixth Circuit requires that a plan contain " a clear grant of

200
21

Perez, 150 F.3d at 556-57.
Id.; see also American Flint Glass Workers Union, AFL-CIO v.

Beaumont Glass Co., 62 F.3d 574, 581 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that the four
comers of the contract provide the starting point for contract interpretation).
202 See supra Part I.B (discussing the legislative history and the underlying
purposes of ERISA).
203 See supra Part II (discussing the varying approaches to plan interpretation
and the divergent policy choices underlying each approach).
204 See supra Part II (noting that there are two conflicting visions for
ERISA). The pro-employer interpretation uses deference as an incentive for
employers to provide insurance for their employees. ROSENBLATr, supra note 1,
at 196 (stating that the deferential approach has the effect of reducing the
employers risk of liability and keeps payout down).
20' See Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
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discretion to determine benefits or interpret the terms of the
plan. 2 °6 Recently, however, the court has eased its requirements
for the type of language that suffices to convey discretion to a plan
administrator. 20 7 For example, in Perez v. Aetna Life Insurance
Company, °8 the court held that language such as, "[claimant]
shall furnish written proof of 'total disability' [and] .. .[Aetna]
shall have the right to require as part of the proof of the claim
satisfactory evidence,,,209 was sufficient to preclude a de novo
standard of review despite the fact that the plan failed to specify to
whom the proof must be satisfactory.2z0 Although the language
is subject to numerous interpretations, l' the court reasoned that
the "plain language in its ordinary and popular sense" suggested
that since Aetna requested the evidence and reviewed it, it followed

206

Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 550, 555 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting

Wulf v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 26 F.3d 1368, 1373 (6th Cir. 1994)) (emphasis
added); see also Yeager v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 376, 380-81
(6th Cir. 1996) (holding that claimant must "submit 'satisfactory proof of
disability to us," clearly grants discretion to the plan); Miller v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 983 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the language -disability
determined "on the basis of medical evidence satisfactory to the committee,"- to
be clear enough to warrant an arbitrary and capricious review).
207 Perez, 150 F.3d at 557 (holding the language, shall have the "right to
require as part of the proof of claim satisfactory evidence," vests discretion in
the plan, and warrants a review under an abuse of discretion standard).
208

Id. at 550.

209

Id. at 555 (emphasis added). The Aetna plan provided (1) "Written proof

of total disability must be furnished to [Aetna] within ninety days after the
expiration of the [first twelve months of disability]" and, (2) "[Aetna] shall have
the right to require as part of the proof of claim satisfactory evidence... that
[the claimant] has furnished all required proofs for such benefits" Id.
210

See id. at 556.

211

Id. at 559 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (noting that the failure to specify to

whom the proof must be satisfactory makes the language subject to different
interpretations). The dissent reasons that since the policy was ambiguous about
to whom the proof must be satisfactory (either to the participant or to the plan),
that the "default reading should be an objective standard, satisfactory to a neutral
arbiter ... rather than satisfactory to one of the two interested parties." Id. The
dissent pointed out that "[r]easonable participants reading the language [in the
Aetna plan] would be quite unlikely to be on notice" that the plan will have
enormous discretion to make benefit determinations. Id.
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that they made the benefits determination. 2 The court implied
discretion despite the absence of clear language reserving discretion
to the plan, thus making Aetna's decision to terminate benefits
reviewable under the arbitrary and capricious standard.213
The Seventh Circuit has also taken an implied approach for
conferring discretion in the absence of clear plan language.1 4 In
Patterson v. Caterpillar,the court held that language such as
"benefits will be payable only upon receipt of ... such due proof
as shall be required" was adequate to apply an abuse of discretion
review. 215 The court reasoned that a deferential standard of
review is appropriate even where the language does not state who
must receive the evidence, so long as the plan enunciates what the

212

Id. at 557. The majority stated that the failure of the plan to provide to

whom the evidence must be satisfactory is inconsequential. Id. The court
reasoned that since Aetna had the right to require as part of the proof of the
claim satisfactory evidence, that semantically the evidence must be satisfactory
to Aetna, the only named party with the right to request such evidence. Id. see
also Yeager, 88 F.3d at 381 (holding that the word "satisfactory," obviously
meant satisfactory to the insurance company and ignored the possibility that
"satisfactory," as used by the plan language could warrant an objective
interpretation).
213 Perez, 150 F.3d at 558.
214 See, e.g., O'Bryhim v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 98-1472,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19232, at *13 (4th Cir. Aug. 16, 1999) (stating that the
language "submits satisfactory proof of Total Disability to us" grants discretion
to the plan administrator); Wilcox v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 981036, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 5027, at *7 (4th Cir. Mar. 23, 1999) (noting that
"satisfactory proof' is sufficient to vest discretion in the plan administrator
thereby precluding a de novo review); Patterson v. Caterpillar Inc., 70 F.3d 503,
505 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding that the plan language stating "benefits will be
payable only upon receipt by the Insurance Carrier of such notice and such due
proof, as shall be from time to time required, of such disability" was sufficient
to warrant an arbitrary and capricious review). But see Kearney v. Standard Ins.
Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that "satisfactory proof'
language has three reasonable interpretations and is insufficient to confer
discretion to the plan administrator).
215 70 F.3d 503, 504 (7th Cir. 1995). The Caterpillar plan provides that
"benefits will be payable only upon receipt by the Insurance Carrier or Company
of such notice and such due proof, as shall be from time to time required, of
such disability." Id. at 505 (emphasis added).
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claimant is required to submit. 216 This case was a marked departure from a higher standard of language that had governed in the
Seventh Circuit prior to this case.217 The former benchmark
standard in the Seventh Circuit, as reflected by Donato v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, required the functional equivalent
of express discretion-granting language.2t 8
The relaxed standards used by the courts in this category for
the type of language that is sufficient to confer discretion in the
plan undermine ERISA's notice requirements.219 As the dissent in
Perez aptly noted, when the language contained in the plan is
vague and ambiguous, "reasonable participants reading the
language in the plan would be quite unlikely to be on notice that
the plan will have enormous discretion to make benefit determinations. 22 ° In holding that unclear language suffices to vest
discretion in the plan, these courts fail to provide participants' with
notice of their rights, and fails to reward expectations of benefits
under the plan. This approach to plan interpretation has the dual
effect of undercutting participants' rights, and creating a split
among the circuits. As a result, legislative action is necessary to set
Id. at 505.
See Donato v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 1994)
(holding that the language "all proof must be satisfactory to us" expressly stated
that MetLife had discretionary authority over benefit decisions made pursuant to
the plan).
218 Id. at 379 (noting that the standard in the Seventh Circuit used to be
higher, requiring an explicit discretion-granting language or a functional
equivalent in order to vest discretion in the plan administrator). Recently, courts
in the Seventh Circuit have returned to a Donato type standard for the type of
discretion-granting language that is required in order accord deference to a plan
administrator's decision. See, e.g., Herzberger v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 205 F.3d
327 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that "proof of loss" language is standard in an
insurance contract and is insufficient to invoke discretion with the plan
administrator to construe benefits and determine eligibility). Id. at 329
219 See supra Part I (discussing the role of the Summary Plan Description as
providing participants and beneficiaries with a document on which they base
their expectations of benefits and obtain notice of the terms of the plan, and thus
must be written to be understood by a lay person).
220 Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 550, 559 (6th Cir. 1998) (Boggs,
J., dissenting) (stating that vague and ambiguous language is not sufficient to
provide participants with notice that the plan has discretion).
216

217
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standards for the language necessary to invoke discretion, and to
restore uniformity throughout the federal courts.
b.

Plain Meaning Rule - Method of Interpretation

In developing a body of federal common law for plan interpretation, a number of circuits rely on classical contract theories.22 '

The rationale for applying contract theories to ERISA is based on
the simple idea that employee benefit plans are written contracts.22 2 As such, federal common law rules of contract interpretation determine the meaning of a policy's terms. 2 3 Pursuant to
a plain meaning approach, courts examine the specific language of
the contract and interpret the terms as a reasonably intelligent
person would. 22 a A number of circuits apply a plain meaning rule
to the interpretation of ERISA plan provisions.22 5 Consistent with
221

See, e.g., Perez, 150 F.3d at 557 (relying on general principles of contract

interpretation to interpret the plan provisions according to their plain meaning,
in an ordinary and popular sense); Pitcher v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 93
F.3d 407, 411 (7th Cir. 1996) (interpreting ERISA plans "in an ordinary and
popular sense as would a person of average intelligence and experience")
(quoting Meredith v. Allsteel Inc., 11 F.3d 1354, 1358 (7th Cir. 1993)); Bellino
v. Schlumberger Techs. Inc., 944 F.2d 26, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1991) (using basic
principles of contract interpretation, "natural meaning" and "plain meaning" to
interpret terms of an employee welfare benefit plan).
222 Bullwinkel v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 429, 430-31 (7th
Cir. 1994) (noting that an insurance policy is a written contract that memorializes
an agreement or "meeting of the minds" between the insurer and the insured).
223 Id.
224 See id.; see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 230
(1932) ("The standard of interpretation ... except where it produces an
ambiguous result.., is the meaning that would be attached.., by a reasonably
intelligent person acquainted with all operative usages and knowing all the
circumstances

.

.

").

See, e.g., Perez, 150 F.3d at 556 (relying on general principles of contract
interpretation to interpret the plans provisions according to their plain meaning,
in an ordinary and popular sense); Pitcher, 93 F.3d at 411 (interpreting ERISA
plans in an ordinary and popular sense as would a person of average intelligence
and experience)(quoting Meredith v. Allsteel Inc., 11 F.3d 1354, 1358 (7th Cir.
1993)); Bullwinkel, 18 F.3d at 431 (stating that "we are restricted by federal
common law rules of contract interpretation to view the language of the
insurance policy... and must give effect to the words which denote the bargain,
225
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this approach, courts start by looking at the four comers of the
document.226 If the terms are clear in light of the other provisions
contained in the contract, the court does not allow extrinsic
evidence such as legislative intent or the parties' interpretations.227 The problem with the application of the plain meaning
rule is that the courts are reluctant to find the plan's discretiongranting language ambiguous.228 Consequently, the application of
this rule results in an arbitrary and capricious review of the plan
administrator's denial, which hinders a participant's recovery.229

Although the plain meaning approach is consistent with Firestone,23 its misapplication by the federal courts undercuts the

not in light of public policy considerations, but in light of their plain meaning");
Bartlett v. Martin Marietta Operations Support, Inc. Life Ins. Plan, 38 F.3d 514,
517 (10th Cir. 1994) (applying a plain meaning analysis to determine the
meaning of plan terms); Hughes v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 264, 268
(1st Cir. 1994) (giving language in an ERISA regulated insurance policy its
"natural meaning"); Meredith v. Allsteel Inc., 11 F.3d 1354, 1358 (7th Cir. 1993)
(stating that federal common law rules of contract interpretation require the
courts to interpret the insurance contract "in an ordinary and popular sense as
would a person of average intelligence and experience"); Bellino v. Schlumberger Techs. Inc., 944 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1991) (the court used basic
principles of contract interpretation, "natural meaning" and "plain meaning" to
interpret terms of an employee welfare benefit plan).
226 Perez, 150 F.3d at 556 (noting that the four corners of the contract
provide the starting point for contract interpretation) (citing American Flint Glass
Workers Union AFL-CIO v. Beaumont Glass Co., 62 F.3d 574, 581 (3d Cir.
1995)).
227

Bellino, 944 F.2d at 32.

228

See supra note 224 (discussing the application of the plain meaning rule

to denial of benefit claims under ERISA).
229 O'Neil, supra note 81, at 749 (stating that under an arbitrary and
capricious review, the court will give deference to an administrator's decision if
it is supported by substantial evidence). The decision will not be reversed even
if a preponderance of evidence supports a contrary conclusion. As a result,
judicial deference to the decision of a plan administrator sharply increases a
claimant's disadvantage and almost always results in negative results for
claimants. O'Neil, supra note 81, at 749.
230 Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989) (directing
courts to consider "the provisions of the [plan] as interpreted in light of all the
circumstances and such other evidence of the intention of the [plan's creator]
with respect to the [plan] as is not inadmissable" and represents a divergence
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legislative intent behind ERISA.
An example of such a misapplication can be found in Perez v.
Aetna Life Insurance Company. ' The plan in Perez states
"[claimant] shall furnish written proof of 'total disability' ...
[Aetna] shall have the right to require as part of the proof of the
claim satisfactory evidence. 232 Although the plan fails to clearly
state to whom the proof must be satisfactory, the court held that the
language as interpreted in its ordinary and popular sense suggests
that the right to require proof of satisfactory evidence means the
evidence must be satisfactory to Aetna, for Aetna is the only
named party who maintains the right to request evidence.2 33 The
majority opined that when read together, the logical conclusion of
the phrases mandates that the proof must be satisfactory to
Aetna.234 The dissent asserts that there was no clear grant of
235 In light of the absence of
discretion as required by Firestone.
clear language, the dissent argued that the difference between
"satisfactory" and "satisfactory to Aetna" was too great to infer,
and thus opted for the term "satisfactory" to be viewed objectively,
in favor of the plan participant.236

between legislative intent and practical enforcement)(quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 4, comment d (1959)).
231 150 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 1998).
232 Id. at 555 (emphasis added). The Aetna plan provided (1) "[wlritten proof
of total disability must be furnished to [Aetna] within ninety days after the
expiration of the [first twelve months of disability]" (2) [Aetna] shall have the
right to require as part of the proof of claim satisfactory evidence.., that [the
claimant] has furnished all required proofs for such benefits." Id.
233

Id. at 556.

See supra note 211 (discussing how the Perez majority reasoned that
ambiguities in the language were inconsequential, since logically Aetna was the
only party that was able to request and review evidence).
235 See Perez, 150 F.3d 558-59 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
236 Id. (stating that unless a policy makes it explicit that the proof must be
satisfactory to the decision-maker, the better reading of "satisfactory proof' is
that it establishes an objective standard, (proof satisfactory to a reasonable
participant) rather than a subjective one (proof satisfactory to the plan administrator)); see also, Kinstler, 181 F.3d at 252 (holding that where a plan is read to
require "satisfactory proof," an objective reading is favored); Kearney, 175 F.3d
at 1086 (holding that "satisfactory written proof' was insufficient to reserve
discretion to the plan administrator and invoke a de novo review).
234
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The majority misapplied the plain meaning rule when it inferred
that the plan contained clear and unambiguous discretion-granting
language.2 37 The fact that both the majority and the dissent have
differing reasonable interpretations of the plan language suggests
that the plan's language is ambiguous. 38 Accordingly, a consideration of extrinsic evidence, such as legislative intent, was warranted
and should have been applied to reach a contrary result.
The Fourth Circuit applied similar principles, as a matter of
common law in O'Bryhim v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance" 9
In O'Bryhim, the Fourth Circuit held that the plain meaning of the
language - "submits satisfactory proof ...

to us" - was sufficient

to invoke an abuse of discretion standard for judicial review.24 °
Based on the plain meaning of the language interpreted in light of
the other provisions contained in the policy, the court found no
ambiguity in the language, and no occasion to consider legislative
intent or the parties' interpretation.2 4 1 This approach is contrary
to the Second Circuit in Kinstler,242 where the court determined
that the plan language - "submits satisfactory proof.

. .

to us" -

was insufficient to preclude de novo review of the administrator's
decision. 243 The court held that an arbitrary and capricious review
of the plan administrator's decision was not warranted because the
language in the policy was subject to more than one reasonable
237 Perez, 150
238 Id. at 556,

F.3d at 557.
559. In addition to the differing interpretations of the plan
language by both the majority and the dissent, a third reading by a reasonable
person of average intelligence is plausible. This reading suggests that all the plan
language requests is "written proof' and "satisfactory evidence that the claimant
has furnished such written proof." Id. at 560. Thus, a claimant who furnishes
proof via a facsimile transmission and receives confirmation that the transmission
went through, could be under the impression that he or she has satisfactory
evidence (the confirmation) that written proof had been submitted to the plan.
239 O'Bryhim v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 98-1472, 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19232, at *13 (4th Cir. Aug. 16, 1999).
240

Id. at *14.

241 Id. at * 14-15; see

also Yeager v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 88 F.3d

376 (6th Cir. 1996); Donato v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 375 (7th Cir. 1994).
242 Kinstler, 181 F.3d 243.
243 See supra notes 174-193 and accompanying text (discussing how the
Second Circuit requires explicit language or a functional equivalent in order to
confer discretion to determine benefit eligibility to the plan).
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interpretation. 244 The court applied contra proferentem to resolve
the ambiguity in the plan language in favor of the participant.245
O'Bryhim and Kinstler illustrate how the various circuits interpret
the same plan language differently, causing participants who live
in the Second Circuit and the Fourth Circuit to be faced with
different coverage results despite being governed by the same plan
language.
The misapplication of the plain meaning rule to ERISA plan
interpretation fails to safeguard participants' rights and creates
disunity among the circuits.24 6 The propensity of some courts to

find terms unambiguous based on the plain meaning of the plan's
language, precludes consideration of a reasonable participants' point
of view. As a result, employers have an incentive to structure plans
with vague discretion-granting language. This conflicts with
ERISA's central purposes of providing adequate notice and
awarding benefit expectations.247
It is clear that Congress intended the courts to develop rules to
govern actions for benefits.248 Those rules, however, must be
consistent with the purposes of ERISA. The approach taken by the
courts in this category view ERISA's primary purpose as encouraging employers voluntarily to offer benefit plans by limiting the

244

See supra note 179-180 and accompanying text (discussing the

application of contra proferentem in instances where the language is subject to
two or more reasonable interpretations).
245 Kinstler, 181 F.3d at 251.
246 See supra notes 230-237 and accompanying text (discussing problems
with the application of the plain meaning rule to ambiguous plan language).
247 Kinstler, 181 F.3d at 252 n.3 (noting that awarding deference to a plan
that contains vague discretion-granting language creates a perverse incentive for
employers to use vague language to insulate them from a higher standard of
review); see also Firestone, 489 U.S. at 118 (noting that Congress' purpose in
enacting ERISA disclosure provisions was so that "the individual participant
knows exactly where he stands with respect to the plan.") (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 93-533, at 11 (1973)).
248 See 120 CONG. REC. S29942 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (Statement of Sen.
Javits) (stating that "a body of federal substantive law will be developed by the
courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare
and pension plans").
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liability of employers and maximizing their discretion.2 49 This
policy choice favors deference to the plan and the application of
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review for denial of benefit
claims. This policy would not be objectionable but for the
propensity of the courts to find clear discretion-granting language
in ambiguous plan terms. The application of this policy to ERISA
denial of benefit claims results in a failure to fulfill the legislative
intent of safeguarding participants' rights through notice and
disclosure and leaves participants with less protection than they
would have under state law. 250 In addition, this approach serves
to defeat uniformity in the administration of employee welfare
benefit plans. As a result of this "pro-employer" approach, and the
division resulting from the circuit split, Congress must amend
ERISA to ensure that the language used by employers to vest
discretion in a plan administrator is explicit and provides participants with adequate notice.
III. WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO THE TWIN AIMs OF ERISA?
Congress must amend ERISA in order to fulfill its stated
legislative purpose of protecting "the interests of participants in
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries ...

by establishing

standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries
of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate
remedies, sanctions, and ready access to federal courts.,, 251 The
use by some courts of an implied discretion approach despite
unclear plan language has the dual effect of undercutting participant safeguards and promoting disunity across the jurisdictions.

249

See supra notes 12, 113-116 and accompanying text (discussing the

struggle over two versions of ERISA).

250 ROSENBLATT, supra note 1, at 219 (noting that the purpose of ERISA

was to provide participants and their beneficiares with more protection than they
had traditionally been afforded under state law). State law contract doctrines aim
to honor the reasonable expectations of insureds, contain an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, and favor the insureds interests through the
application of doctrines such as contra proferentem. ROSENBLATr, supra note 1,

at 146-147.
251 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000).
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Moreover, a finding that ambiguous plan language is sufficient to
vest discretion in the plan administrator fails to afford participants
notice of their rights, and provides an incentive for employers to
negotiate plans with elusive language. In order to fulfill both
congressional intent and the Supreme Court's vision for ERISA, the
statute must be amended to finally "promote the interests of
252
employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans"
and "to protect contractually defined benefits.'

' 253

A. Arbitrary & Capricious Standard of Review-Failure to
Safeguard ParticipantsRights
The lenient application of the deferential abuse of discretion
standard creates negative results for claimants. 254 A finding by
the court that a plan administrator has discretionary authority and
the subsequent application of an arbitrary and capricious standard
to a dispute is the practical equivalent of the cessation of judicial
review over that administrator's decision. 255 As one commentator
has noted, "the rule of deferential review .

.

. serves no apparent

function other than to impede protection of employee benefit
rights. 256
It must be remembered that ERISA was designed "to promote
the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee
benefit plans., 257 "ERISA clearly instructs courts, in developing
plan-related law, to treat as paramount the goal of protecting

252
253
254

Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985).
See, e.g., Meditrust Financial Services Corporation v. Sterling Chemicals

Inc., 168 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming the plan administrator's denial of
claim under an arbitrary and capricious standard); Sheppard & Enoch Pratt
Hosp., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 32 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1994); Pierre v.
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552 (5th Cir. 1991). See generally
O'Neil, supra note 81, at 749 n.156 (stating that "[tihe deferential standard has
been applied to countless ERISA cases, almost always with negative results for
claimants.").
255 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
256 See Conison, supra note 12, at 60.
257 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 113 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463
U.S. 85, 90 (1983)).
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employee rights and expectations relating to benefits from
plans. 2 58 A court's finding that an arbitrary and capricious
standard applies despite the presence of ambiguous language shows
little concern for this instruction and allows plan sponsors to
"evade the fundamental purpose of ERISA. '259 Critics of this
standard argue that it "pays little attention to ERISA's central
purpose of safeguarding benefit expectations and rights" and "often
seems perversely designed to thwart benefit expectations.2 6 °
When rendering their decisions, courts must give consideration to
the purposes of ERISA and the consequences of a finding of
deferential review lest they convert ERISA from a shield for
employees into a sword for employers and insurance companies.
Additionally, the Supreme Court's holding in Firestone, and
Congress' silence as to the appropriate standard of review for denial
of benefit claims, has resulted in divergent interpretations and
applications by federal courts. The consequence of the interpretation used by the Fourth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits261 is that
ERISA's goals of safeguarding patients' rights as well as promoting
predictability and uniformity within the system is compromised.262

258 See

Conison, supra note 52, at 579 (discussing how the federal common
law surrounding Section 1132 (a)(1)(B) is inconsistent with ERISA's purposes
of safeguarding participants' rights and awarding benefit expectations because it
allows employers to structure a plan using ambiguous language which defeats
benefit expectations).
259 Conison, supra note 52, at 635-636 (stating that the use of a deferential
standard of review is "a doubtful rule" that allows plan sponsors to "evade the
fundamental purpose of ERISA").
260 Conison, supra note 12, at 3 (noting that an arbitrary and capricious
standard for denial of benefit claims fails to safeguard patients' rights, and seems
"perversely designed to thwart [participants'] benefit expectations").
261 See supra Part II.A.2. (discussing circuits that imply discretion to the plan
administrator despite ambiguous plan language).
262 Jonathan Heyl, Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law and the
Fourth Circuit: Bedrick v. Travelers Insurance Co.: The Fourth Circuit's
ContinuedAttempt to Work with the 'DoctrinalHash' of the Standard of Review
in ERISA Benefit Denial Cases, 75 N.C.L. REv. 2382, 2426 (1997) (noting that
the Court's decision in Firestone and Congress' failure to specify a standard of
review "sacrifices predictability and threatens to discourage plan formation").
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B. Problems With Uniformity
One of the fundamental purposes of ERISA was national
uniformity over employees' benefits plans.26 3 In fact, national

uniformity was one of the stated reasons why ERISA preempted
then existing state laws. 264 The diverging approaches and results
by the various circuit courts defeat ERISA's purpose of national
uniformity. A prime example of similarly situated employees being
treated differently by the courts is available through analysis of the
O'Bryhim case in the Fourth Circuit 265 and Kinstler in the Second
Circuit.266 In both cases the plan language governing the employees was identical. If ERISA's goal of national uniformity had been
267
fulfilled, the employees would have been treated similarly.
They were not. One was accorded de novo review over his denial
of benefits.268 The other received only arbitrary and capricious
review. 269 O'Bryhim and Kinstler illustrate how two employees,
subject to the same plan language, but living in different parts of
the country, have different rights and receive different treatment
under ERISA's presumably nationally uniform policies. It seems
unlikely that the courts will resolve this divergence without
Congress amending ERISA.
C. Notice and Rewarding Benefit Expectations
The legislative history behind ERISA's disclosure provisions
suggests that another purpose behind the passage of ERISA was to
ensure that "the individual participant knows exactly where he
See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
See 120 CONG. REC. H29197 (daily ed. Aug 20, 1974) (statement of Rep.
Dent) (noting that many considered "the crowning achievement of [ERISA is]
the reservation to federal authority [of] the sole power to regulate the field of
employee benefit plans... eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent
state and local regulation").
265 O'Bryhim, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19232, at *1.
266 Kinstier, 181 F.3d 243.
263

264

267 See supra Part II.2.A.
268

Kinstier, 181 F.3d at 251.

269

O'Bryhim, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19232, at *14.
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stands with respect to the plan. 2 7' The presence of unclear
language in the plan's SPD fails to comport with the notice and
reporting requirements set forth in ERISA.27 ' When confronted
with this issue, the Ninth Circuit, in Stahl v. Tony Bldg. Materials,
Inc.,272 held that the SPD must be clear for it "does no good
unless an employee can read and digest it."' 27 3 The obvious
objection to the use of ambiguous discretion-granting language is
that it allows an employee to structure a plan in a way that
facilitates the defeat of the participants' benefit expectations. 4
As the dissent in Perez v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. correctly
pointed out, the vague language contained in plans do not provide
reasonable participants with notice that the plan administrator has
such enormous discretion. 275 Since one of the central policies of
ERISA is to award benefit expectations, adequate notice of the
rights and remedies that a participant has is tantamount in ensuring
that benefit expectations are well grounded and to lessen the risk
of disappointment. 276 Acceptance of evasive language as sufficient to preclude de novo review provides employers and plans
with an incentive to supply inadequate notice by purposely using
vague discretion-granting language.

270

271

Firestone,489 U.S. at 116 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-533, 11 (1973)).
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1022, 1023, 1025 (2000); see also id. § 1022(a)(1)(b)

(requiring that the SPD must be written in a manner calculated to be understood
by the average plan participant and that the SPD contain a description of
circumstances which may result in disqualification, ineligibility, or denial or loss
of benefits).
272 875 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1989).
273 Id. at 1409.
274 See Conison, supra note 12, at 35 (noting that the competing interests of
employers and participants leads to the creation of plans that present a substantial
danger of defeating the expectations that the plan creates in the participant).
275 Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 550, 559 (6th Cir. 1998).
276 See Conison, supra note 12, at 2 (stating that "the central policy of
[ERISA] is that employees should receive the pensions and other benefits they
were led to believe they would get").

556

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

D. Perverse Incentivesfor Employers
In addition to the other arguments calling for the use of an
explicit grant of discretion or a functional equivalent, it is important to consider the perverse incentives that employers have to deny
treatment pursuant to ERISA's preemption provisions.277 Since
ERISA's preemption provisions limit any recovery to equitable
relief, employers and plans have a perverse incentive to include
vague language since they face no likelihood of extra contractual
damages.278 Toward that end, the Ninth Circuit cautioned that
construing ambiguous language to vest discretion in a plan would
encourage employers to use vague language to insulate themselves
from having to pay out benefits owed to participants. 279 As the
late Judge Wisdom observed,
We do not want to encourage an employer to insulate
himself from effective appellate review through the abuse
of vague phrases that fail to make clear to the employees
that the employer will have the final determination of
benefit decisions. Employees who lose promised benefits
should not lose the additional benefit of judicial review
because their employer reserved discretionary power to
itself without making that reservation clear.28 °
A finding that a plan reserves discretion based on elusive plan
language has the result of affording participants less protection

277

See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (stating that ERISA preempts "any and all State

laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan);
Id. § 1132(a); Pilot Life Ins. Co., v. Dedeaux 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (holding that
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions under Section 1132(a) are limited
exclusively to equitable remedies for violations related to employee benefit
plans).
278 ROSENBLATr, supra note 1, at 1046 (noting that ERISA preemption has
given insurers and plans the perverse incentive to make medically and factually
unsupportable coverage decisions because they face no likelihood of damages).
279 See Bogue v. Ampex Corp., 976 F.2d 1319, 1325 (9th Cir. 1992).
280 Id. at 1325 (quoting Judge Wisdom, sitting by designation with the Ninth

Circuit).
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under ERISA than they had previously enjoyed under state
28 2
law. 28' The Second Circuit, in Kinstler v. First Reliance,
cautioned against this position and also noted that "since clear
language can be readily drafted and included in policies, even in
the context of collectively bargained benefit plans when the parties
really intend to subject claim denials to judicial review under a
deferential standard, courts should require clear language. .. 283
A failure to require clear and explicit language reserving discretion
to the plan fails to provide participants with notice of their rights,
in direct contradiction of the statute.
E. FiduciaryDuty and Conflict of Interest - Modified
DeferentialReview
Section 1102 (a)(1) of ERISA provides that "[E]very employee
benefit plan shall be established and maintained pursuant to a
written instrument ...[and] such instrument shall provide for one

or more named fiduciaries who jointly or severally shall have
authority to control and manage the operation and administration
of the plan. 284 The fiduciary or plan administrator named in the
plan is not required to be independent of the plan sponsor, thus
leaving the potential for a conflict of interest.285 ERISA was
enacted in 1974, a time known as the "blank check era" in the
medical community. 286 With little focus on cost containment, and

281

Mertens v. Hewitt Ass'n, 508 U.S. 248, 266-67 (1993) (White, J.,

dissenting) (stating that reference to "appropriate equitable relief' contained in
ERISA's civil enforcement provision should not be limited exclusively to
equitable remedies). "Construing the statute in this manner avoids the anomaly
of interpreting ERISA so as to leave those Congress set out to protect - the
participants in ERISA governed plans and their beneficiaries with less protection
... than they enjoyed before ERISA was enacted." Id. (quoting Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989)).
282 Kinstler v. First Reliance Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1999).
283

Id. at 252.

284
285

29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2000).
Id. § 1108(c)(3). For example, a company may serve as an administrator

to an employer funded plan, or an insurance company may administer the plan
and pay claims out of funds it has received from employer premiums.
286 See JAMES C. ROBINSON, THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 65
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a reliance on the LMRA, courts presumed that they should defer to
fiduciary decisions about benefit entitlement and plan interpretation.18 Today, however, in light of managed care principles and
an emphasis on cost containment, most plan administrators have a
financial interest in curtailing the payment of benefits.288 Consequently, the relationship between a participant in a health plan and
the plan administrator is not a neutral relationship. 289 Accordingly, granting unfettered deference to a plan administrator who has
an economic incentive to keep treatment costs low is inappropriate
290
because of the conflict of interest it presents.

(1999).
The 'Blank Check Era' of medicine in the U.S. refers to a period of
time under which traditional indemnity insurance governed the delivery
of health care services in this county. Indemnity insurance refers to a
payment structure under which physicians' provided services to
patients, and were then subsequently paid by the patient or by the
patients' insurer for the services rendered. The indemnity contract or
service contract covered clinical services provided by any licensed
physician, without differentiation according to cost or quality.
Physicians billed services and received reimbursement on a fee for
service basis. This era is marked by having very high rates of
reimbursement for services, and is charged in part with contributing to
the health care cost crisis that brought about initiatives and attempts at
health care reform.
Id. at 65.
287 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (discussing the wholesale
importation of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review from LMRA cases
into ERISA).
288 O'Neil, supra note 81, at 749 (noting that plan administrators may have
financial incentives to deny treatment).
By holding that deferential review of ERISA benefits decisions turns
on the particular language of the plan rather than questions of conflict
of interest, bias, and lack of impartiality on the part of the plan
administrator, [Firestone] seriously undermined the purpose of ERISA
even as the Court affirmed that ERISA was intended to 'promote the
interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit
plans.'
O'Neil, supra note 81, at 749 (citing Firestone, 489 U.S. 101 at 113).
289 O'Neil, supra note 81, at 749.
290 See Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556-67
(11th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 489 U.S. 1040 (1990) (noting that the fiduciary
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The Supreme Court in Firestone recognized this potential
conflict, and suggested that a plan administrator's conflict of
interest "must be weighed as 'a factor in determining whether
there is an abuse of discretion."' 2 9' This became known as a
modified abuse of discretion standard, which affords less deference
to an administrator's review when he or she is operating under a
conflict of interest.292 In light of the emphasis on cost contain-

ment placed upon plan administrators, it seems inconsistent to
allow employers and plans the additional advantage of structuring
a policy to defeat participants' expectations. 293 The use of vague
discretion-granting language, and the tendency of some courts to
accord deference despite such language, simply enlarges the
potential for ineffective judicial review.
E

Statutory Reform

Congress should amend ERISA to require that health plans
contain explicit or express discretion-granting language, such as
"discretion" or "deference to" in order to effectively confer discretion upon the plan administrator and restrict judicial review to an
abuse of discretion standard. Congress' intent behind enacting
ERISA was to safeguard the rights of participants and beneficiaries

role of an insurance company lies in perpetual conflict with its profit making role
as a business).
291'Firestone,489 U.S. at 115 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS

§ 187 (1959)).
292

See Brown, 898 F.2d 1556-1567 (stating that when a plan beneficiary

demonstrates that there is a substantial conflict of interest on the part of the
fiduciary responsible for benefit determinations, the burden shifts to the fiduciary
to prove that its interpretation of plan provisions committed to its discretion was
not tainted by self interest).
293 O'Neil, supra note 81, at 749.
The relationship between a benefits claimant and a benefits plan
administrator is not a neutral relationship. With very few exceptions,
the plan administrator - whether the employer itself, a retained
administrator of an employer-funded plan, or an insurance company will have a financial interest in curtailing the payment of benefits, an
interest often heightened in the current cost-conscious climate.
O'Neil, supra note 81, at 749.
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and to promote a predictable and uniform system for the structure
and administration of employee welfare benefit plans.294 Although
this amendment will not ensure that incorrect decisions are
remedied, it will fulfill ERISA's promise of providing participants
and their beneficiaries with notice of their rights and establish
uniform standards for judicial review of ERISA denial of benefit
claims.295
Providing participants with notice will have the dual effect of
creating an informed and educated participants, and rewarding the
contractually defined benefit expectations promised in the plan.296
Although notice alone will not be able to rectify incorrect decisions, an educated participant will operate as a check on plan
administrators, thereby promoting administrative efficiency.
Moreover, this amendment leaves room for parties to negotiate
alternatives to judicial resolution in the context of the collectively
bargained agreement. Parties contracting for health benefits could
provide for alternative dispute resolution, such as arbitration and
mediation, in an effort to resolve denial of benefit claims without
involving the judiciary. Pursuant to this alternative, the parties
involved would be able to negotiate a procedure and a standard of
review for the resolution of the dispute, thereby conserving costs
to participants and eliminating the burden on courts. Although this
amendment enables plans to receive an arbitrary and capricious
standard of review, it comports with ERISA's purpose of safeguarding participants rights by ensuring that participants' will have
explicit notice of their rights, and that their benefit expectations
will be rewarded. 297 Additionally, setting a standard for the type
294

See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).

295 See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text (discussing the importance

of ERISA's information disclosure requirements, the summary plan description
and the importance the SPD as the governing document in the administration of
benefits).
296 See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 112 (noting that ERISA was designed to
promote the interest of employees in employee welfare benefit plans and to
protect contractually defined benefits); see also Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463
U.S. 85, 90 (1983); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148
(1985).
297 See Heyl, supra note 262, at 2420 (stating that a de novo review would
further certain goals, but there are other practical concerns such as increased
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of language necessary to invoke an arbitrary and capricious review
will serve to promote uniformity and stability in the drafting and
structuring of private health plans.
CONCLUSION

It is clear that Congress intended the courts to develop rules to
govern actions for benefits.298 Those rules however, must be
consistent with the purposes of ERISA. The federal common law
approach to standard of review creates a divergence between
legislative intent and practical enforcement. Contrary to ERISA's
legislative purpose, courts have interpreted plan language in ways
that undermine participants' rights, and provide employers and plan
administrators with a perverse incentive to structure plans containing vague language. An amendment to ERISA requiring that plans
use explicit discretion-granting language, such as "discretion to" or
"deference to" in order to effectively confer an arbitrary and
capricious standard of review for denial of benefit claims is
necessary to comport with ERISA's protective policies of safeguarding benefit expectations through notice, and promoting
uniformity throughout the system of benefits administration.

litigation and administrative costs. As a result of a reduction of plan benefits,
costs would be passed on to participants through higher premiums); George Lee
Flint, Jr., ERISA: The Arbitrary and Capricious Rule Under Siege, 39 CATH. U.

L. REv. 133, 181 (1989) (noting that plan administrators are concerned that a
higher standard of review would increase litigation, costs to the plan, and
ultimately participants premiums).
298 See 120 CONG. REC. S29942 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (Statement by
Sen. Javits). Senator Javits said that "a body of federal substantive law will be
developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under
private welfare and pension plans." Id.

